Stuart K. Hayashi

On this blog I have previously written of two fallacies. In this essay, I will say how I think the two are related. I will also discuss the manner in which I think they are connected to a third fallacy that I have also addressed. And I will conclude with an iteration of how I think my rejection of the third fallacy is the result of my having a conclusion that is the perfect inverse of the implicit premise of advocates of the first two fallacies.
These are the first two fallacies: (1) the denial that humans possess free will, and (2) the denial that humans are capable of originality in art and invention.
There are deniers of free will who deny it on the basis of supernatural claims. They pronounce that God, gods, prophecies, or the “movements” of stars directly determine the entire courses of our life. But here I am thinking of those who deny free will on an allegedly secular basis. Following in the tradition of the philosopher Baruch Spinoza, they purport to show that Aristotle’s Laws of Identity and Causality themselves preclude free will. I have refuted the argument in more detail over here, here, here, and here. For the purpose of this new essay, I will say that they presume that because the human brain can be reduced to flesh and chemical reactions, it follows that there is no free will. And they continue that if your decision-making is influenced by any preexisting context, then that precludes free will. They would have it that in what you mistake for decision-making on your part, you are really a machine that is made out of meat and is ultimately running on the programming of chemical reactions and conditioning from environmental stimuli.
There are also those who deny that anything in artwork or invention is truly original. They propound that any artwork or invention that is initially praised for being original turns out not to be. They say that their reason for concluding as much is that every allegedly-original artwork or invention was at least partially inspired by other, preexisting artworks or inventions. The mere existence of any influences prior to the new artwork or invention, they assert, precludes any originality to be found in the new artwork or invention. They say that the idea of “originality” is misleading at best and quite illusory. As a substitute, they continue in their rhetoric, we should concede that any artwork or invention that we value should be praised simply as a competent “re-mix” and nothing beyond that. We are to settle for believing that everything we value is no more than a “re-mixing” of long-established conventions, and resigning ourselves to that conclusion is the best we can do. I have refuted that fallacy over here.
It is not unusual for deniers of originality to be, at least implicitly, deniers of free will as well. I have noticed this pattern over the years in philosophically-utilitarian Libertarians on Facebook. This has been especially a pattern in utilitarian Libertarians who stitch together very trite straw-man arguments against the validity of intellectual property rights. Now I think I know the connection.
Intellectual originality is something that requires the deliberate taking of initiative. The capacity for producing something original is incumbent upon someone being proactive in willingly choosing to venture into areas of thought that do not have well-established precedent. And the secular denial of free will is something that denigrates, from the outset, any acknowledgment of the very same proactivity. When a man downplays and denigrates acknowledgment of the necessity of free will in producing works of originality, that man encounters cognitive dissonance insofar as he celebrates artworks or inventions that he senses, at least implicitly, to demonstrate a sizable degree of novelty.
The attempted solution to that cognitive dissonance is to denigrate these praised-as-original works as a fortuitous result of people still doing something that, when it comes to how they use their nervous systems, is much more passive than what proactive originality would entail. In this interpretation, people passively “re-mix” the same conventional practices in art and engineering that have always have been “re-mixed,” and the works that stand out the most are the most serendipitously beneficial “re-mixes.” In lieu of acknowledging the proactiveness — the free will — in originality, the deniers of free will and originality pronounce that our favorite artworks and inventions came about as the most-fortuitous effects of relatively psychologically-passive “re-mixing” of traditions that humans have always practiced. Hence, the explicit denial of originality is the logical corollary to the irrational presumption that an adult’s actions cannot be attributed accurately to the proactively volitional choice-making of the adult herself.
Now we come to the third fallacy, the fallacy I most want to address in this essay. Many of the same deniers of free will and originality have another favorite stock-conclusion. They tell me, “You Objectivists want to believe that reality — even ethics — can be understood in terms of relatively simple principles. Yet reality itself is too messy and complex for your nice-and-neat logic. And that means reality is, in turn, too messy and complex for your simplistic principles.”
You may note that part of the third fallacy is largely a simpler restatement of Immanuel Kant’s fallacious “Analytic-Synthetic Dichotomy.” I have already refuted the “Analytic-Synthetic Dichotomy.” over here. That is the part that says that the material reality you experience is too chaotic for Nice-and-Neat Logic to apply to it. Rather than refute that fallacy again, I here want to address how I think it stems at least partially from the other two fallacies, the denials of free will and originality. I find it ironic when the deniers of free will and originality say that reality is so complex that to live by principles is to try to oversimplify life. It is ironic, as the deniers’ pseudo-definitions of “free will” and “originality” are the actual oversimplifications. As a faculty of the human mind, free will is complex enough that it is not precluded if decision-making is influenced by factors external to the decision-making consciousness. Likewise as an important function of the human mind, intellectual originality is complex enough that the originality within an artwork or invention can still be recognized and appreciated even as that artwork or invention was inspired by previous works. Yet in their proclaiming reality as too complex for logic, the deniers’ implicit message is that logic and rationality themselves are too existentially simple even to begin to become applicable in the face of the complexities of reality and ethics.
People who accuse Objectivism and me of oversimplification in my trying to make sense of reality and ethics are the ones doing the actual oversimplification. They are trying to push an interpretation of human volitional consciousness that is oversimplified to the point that it cannot countenance the factual existence of free will or originality. I find that when public commentators like Sam Harris try to portray the mind as so simple that free will and originality are presumed not to exist, those commentators can conclude that human behavior is explained not by complex internal psychological phenomena but instead simpler and more-predictable unconscious bodily functions and environmental stimuli. That is, when a man denies the complexity of the mind and its volition, that man can “explain” (pseudo-explain) human actions as though they are relatively simple and predictable. But that oversimplified interpretation of human behavior does not leave room for addressing the seeming nuances of ethics. That leads these people to write off the discipline of ethics as too complicated to be understood in terms of principles anyway. (Of course, that is an internal contradiction: if science “proved” that the chemical processes of the mind are too simple for the mind to possess free will and understand reality in terms of consistent principles, then the mind would not be capable of knowing that science “proved” as much!)
I think I know how to phrase it now: in its necessarily volitional nature, the human mind is complex. And it is the complexity of that volitional nature that allows the mind to induce relatively simplified principles by which Nature and even ethics can be understood accurately. But the deniers of free will and originality try to reverse that: they presume the mind to be too simple even to possess the capacity for original thinking and the free will that intellectual original thinking requires. And the corollary to that presumption is the conclusion that reality and ethics must be too complicated for that same overly-simple mind to comprehend in the form of consistent principles.
For Sam Harris-type deniers of free will and utilitarian Libertarian economists who deny originality, it is the mind that is simple — too simple to exercise free will and originality — and the mind being simple makes material reality and ethics too complex to be understood in the form of principles. By contrast, my interpretation is that the human mind is complex, and that complexity allows for the mind to study the complexities of material reality and ethics to the point where they can be understood terms that can be made relatively simple. Those relatively-simple terms are the valid principles.