Showing posts with label literary symbolism. Show all posts
Showing posts with label literary symbolism. Show all posts

Saturday, May 02, 2026

Humans Are a GMO and Have Been One Since the Stone Age

Genetically Modified As an Effect of the Technology of Our Apelike Ancestors

Stuart K. Hayashi




Model of Australopithecus afarensis at the Natural History Museum of Vienna; photo by Wolfgang  Sauber; courtesy Wikimedia Commons
Photo by Wolfgang Sauber;
courtesy Wikimedia Commons
In the near future, human couples might use in-vitro fertilization and then, while it is still an embryo, alter the DNA of their future child to edit out particular DNA sequences that would otehrwise predispose the child to hereditary diseases. This is formally called germline genetic engineering and derided with the pejorative label of “designer babies.” People fear the idea of technology altering the DNA of humans. They fret that this will bring about an unprecedented level of horror as depicted in such classic science-fiction dystopias as Brave New World and Gattaca. But the truth is that our species, Homo sapiens sapiens, has been a GMO from the start. Our species was genetically modified and outwardly physiologically altered as a consequence of the technology of our ancestors, ancestral species as recent as Homo erectus and possibly something as far back in the past as the much-hairier Australopithecus afarensis (as shown in the Wikimedia Commons photo on the left).

As of this writing, there have been no fewer than two proposed courses through which Stone-Age technology has produced, at least indirectly, revisions in the genetic makeup of the first Homo sapiens sapiens — yes, the sapiens is listed twice in our species’s official name. One route has do to with fire: that gift from that premodern Frankenstein, Prometheus. When meat is raw, the meat-eater has to expend a lot of calories to chew and digest it. When Homo erectus began cooking meat, it was a way for Homo erectus to complete part of the digestion process even before the meat entered anyone’s mouth. In this respect, a cooking fire or stove’s burner can be thought of as a “stomach external to the human body.” When the meat was cooked, it reduced the number of calories that Homo erectus had to expend on chewing the meat.

The paleo-anthropologist Richard Wrangham theorizes that the calories left over then went to expanding the brains of the Homo erectus. Our ancestral environment “selected” for individuals who were genetically predisposed to have their brains grow larger in response to the leftover calories. Hence, someone whose genes had predisposed her brain to enlarge from the leftover calories was one who was likelier to transmit this trait to successive generations. I thank the cultural commentator Scott A. Corbitt for pointing this out to me on the social medium Threads.

However, yet another avenue of Stone-Age technology altering our gene pool goes back even further in time. This one has to do with our ancestors dynamic with stone tools, as observed by cognitive archaeologist Natalie T. Uomini. Our two-legged ancestors would sharpen their stone tools. This was practiced even by species that predated the genus Homo; archaeologists have uncovered evidence of this practice being performed by the hairier, more-apelike Australopithecus afarensis. This practice would involve holding one stone still with one hand, usually the left, and scraping yet another stone against it using the other hand, usually the right hand. Anthropologists refer to this as “flintknapping” or “stone-knapping.” 

In these activities, it was advantageous for a man to have one hand be more dexterous than the other. This practice “selected for” the men who were genetically predisposed to have a dominant hand. Men with a dominant hand were more likely than ambidextrous men to have children and then raise those children into adulthood. (I first learned of this explanation from Michael C. Corballis’s book The Lopsided Ape.) Additionally, Alastair Key and Chris Dunmore have found that this flintknapping also “selected” for thumbs to be more robust. Both of these physiological changes were already noticeable in Homo habilis, which pre-dates fire-making Homo erectus.

As our predecessors Australopithecus, Homo habilis, and Homo erectus already applied their conceptual faculties to restructuring objects from the wild to suit their own purrposes, it follows that our species, Homo sapiens sapiens, has never been without technology. But, more than that, our own species was already genetically altered, albeit unknowingly, by the technology of our ancestors going back at least as far as the chimp-faced Australopithecus.

Even the ancestors who altered us — Homo erectus or a similar contemporary — were genetically modified as a result of the technology of other hominin species that begat them. Homo erectus having genes for thick thumbs and a dominant hand was a byproduct of the technology of the predecessor Homo habilis or some contemporary to Homo habilis. Homo habilis, in turn, inherited the genes for those traits from Australopithecus or something closely related to it. The uses of particular technologies were customs that were ultimately chosen volitionally, and yet these choices influenced which genetically-caused traits were transmitted to successive generations and which were not. The conterminous transmission of chosen customs and unchosen inborn genetics is what ethologists Charles Lumsden and Edward O. Wilson dubbed gene-culture co-evolution.

This ancient pattern of technological transformation educing a corresponding transformation in the human genome and visible physiological traits had continued into the Bronze Age, at least in the region stretching from Europe to Asia. The new development was the switch from hunter-gathering to the farming of grains now being the primary method of obtaining food. In words written by Doug James, Nicky Thomas, and Ben G. Thomas for Seven Days of Science, this is how presenter Emilia Evans paraphrases this discovery of Ali Akbari and David Reich of Harvard and the rest of their team:
...the rate of human evolution has accelerated over the last 10,000 years. ...cattle-herding populations from the Steppes of Eurasia moved into western Europe, bringing with them Bronze-Age technologies. ...cities have been constructed... ...farming and different ways of living seemed to have had profound effects on the human genome. Hundreds of versions of particular genes have become either more or less common over the past 10,000 years, indicating that these accelerating societal and cultural changes have, in turn, driven the acceleration of the evolution of the human genome. ...[Quoting lead author Ali Akbari,] “Everything has changed in the way we live, and that’s reflected in our genome and how it’s trying to catch up.”
Ali Akbari, David Reich, and the rest of their team have identified particular physiological traits that became more prevalent as a ramification of these trends. Such traits included red hair and lighter skin. They were accompanied, strangely enough, by a reduction in the prevalence of male-pattern baldness.

There is a lesson in this for those who abhor technological alteration  as some unnatural tampering with biology. Stone-Age humans were the original ones to conduct genetic engineering on themselves and subsequent human generations, including us. That happened millennia prior to any technician going into a laboratory, placing a cell in a petri dish, and employing chemical methods to splice a foreign DNA segment into that cell.

Ridley Scott’s confusing Prometheus — his prequel to Sigourney Weaver’s Alien movies — portrays humans as having been engineered into existence by extraterrestrials through technologies far beyond what we have today. It turns out that aspects of that story may well be true, except that our technological creator was from Earth and that the technology employed in this endeavor didn’t even need to be as complex as ours.

There are at least two options in how we can interpret this. Should we think of Australopithecus as being in a category separate from ourselves, then, inasmuch as we have descended from Australopithecus or something like it, this Australopithecus was a mad scientist and we humans are his Creation. However, if we include Australopithecus and Homo habilis in the category of “us,” then, insofar as technological restructuring is a form of creativity, this process is an instance of autopoiesis: modern man is indeed self-made. Ultimately it is not the angels but we humans who are, in the words of Lucifer in Paradise Lost, “self-begot, self-raised...”

The technologies employed by our ancient ancestors — flintknapping, fire-making, and farming — were consciously chosen, but their lasting influence on changes to our genetic code were a byproduct that was not consciously chosen. Our Stone-Age ancestors didn’t even know of these effects. By contrast, when future couples engage in more-direct editing of the genetic codes of their children, those edits will indeed be consciously intended choices. For that to happen, these people will have in mind which specific DNA sequences to isolate in order to alter the very specific traits they are targeting. That is an important distinction between the technology-caused gene modificatoin of the near future versus the Pliocene past. But what has remained the consistent pattern since the prehistoric origin of our species is the presence of technology to influence the genetic codes of descendants. 

We would be best off giving up any aversion to GMOs-as-such. Our family lineage had become technologically-created GMOs in the Stone Age prior even to our becoming Homo sapiens sapiens. Far from technological innovation being some sort of deviation from our naturalness, the employment of technological innovation is inherent to human nature itself. Artifice does not refer necessarily to fakery; etymologically it means craftsmanship, being the root of artisan and artwork. And in the present and in the Stone Age, such crafting of both one’s surroundings and one’s own genetic makeup has been the way of the human. Thus, to be artificial is to be natural. It has always been our Stone-Age adaptation as an organism.

Friday, February 13, 2026

Amorous Anguirus

Stuart K. Hayashi



This is a practice drawing I did on Feb. 10, 2024, of Anguirus, the first monster ever to co-star in a movie with Godzilla. Anguirus is based on the real-life ankylosaurus, but I always thought Anguirus looked more like a porcupine. Anguirus is a trademark of Toho Co. Ltd.
 

Thursday, December 25, 2025

Since Its Opening, the Statue of Liberty Has Always Stood for Welcoming Immigrants at ‘the Open Gates of America’

Stuart K. Hayashi


Image courtesy Wikimedia Commons, contributed by ‘AskALotl’


In the United States, MAGA nationalists have gotten sick of hearing the fact that the Statue of Liberty 🗽 delivers a clear invitation to immigrants. These MAGA nationalists are immediately reminded of Emma Lazarus’s poem at the statue’s base where it welcomes the world’s tired and poor huddled masses. These MAGA nationalists recite their stock reply that the poem was only added seventeen years subsequent to the statue’s opening ceremony. They then proclaim that this means that the Statue of Liberty did not originally represent the freedom of immigration.

Donald Trump’s presidential advisor Stephen Miller, who is in charge of ICE’s cruel infractions, is among those who provide this revisionist history about the Statue. In 2017, he sniveled, “...the Statue of Liberty is a symbol of American liberty lighting the world. The poem that you’re referring to was added later [and] is not actually part of the original Statue of Liberty.”

That same year, the same opinion came from the late Rush Limbaugh. On the radio, Limbaugh pontificated,
...the Statue of Liberty and the Emma Lazarus poem is a great illustration of how immigration policy and the United States/Statue of Liberty has become bastardized. “Give us your tired, your poor” and so forth literally has nothing to do with the purpose of the United States.

In fact, it’s never been on the Statue. It is inside the pedestal. It was only put there when they put a museum in there. It was not part of the original Statue of Liberty. It was not part of the design. The statue was a gift to the United States from the people of France as a beacon of freedom and liberty. It’s a testament to our Founding and our Founding Fathers, and this Emma Lazarus poem had nothing to do with it. It had nothing whatsoever to do with it!

The poem was put in the pedestal museum because it was used as part of the fundraising for the pedestal. It’s been co-opted by immigration activists and leftists to actually [split infinitive 😣] now represent U.S. immigration policy, which it isn’t.
Actually, the Statue was associated with immigration at least as early as its opening ceremony in 1886 — seventeen years prior to the addition of Emma Lazarus’s poem. At the ceremony, the U.S. President of the time, Grover Cleveland, gave a speech to dedicate it. In the dedication, he alluded to immigration. And the term that the man used is noteworthy.

Anti-immigrationists frequently employ the term open borders as a pejorative. Yet President Cleveland spoke glowingly of how the Statue of Liberty stands before “the open gates of America.”

We know that Cleveland is here consciously alluding to immigration, as it was a topic on which he commented publicly throughout his presidential terms. He had generally wanted to favor immigrants from everywhere, but he was not completely consistent. When gangs of white-supremacists engaged in vigilante actions against Chinese immigrants, Cleveland properly condemned the violence. Yet, sadly, he ultimately capitulated to pressure from the racists and said that ultimately whites and those of East Asian descent could not coexist in the same neighborhoods. He thus relented to calls for restrictions on Chinese immigration.

Cleveland comes across better when it comes to the nativist clamor against other sets of immigrants they hated. At the time, those from Eastern Europe and Southern Europe were not considered white. They were darker-skinned and darker-haired and mostly were Catholic or Jewish, castigated as racially distinct from the lighter-skinned Protestant majority. As most of these immigrants were impecunious and not fluent in English, legislation to discriminate against them involved Congressional bills allowing immigration only from those who could write in English. Fortunately, Cleveland successfully vetoed those bills, explaining to Congress and the wider public,
It is said...that the quality of recent immigration is undesirable. The time is quite within recent memory when the same thing was said of immigrants who, with their descendants, are now numbered among our best citizens. . . .

I cannot believe that we would be protected against ...evils by limiting immigration to those who can read and write... In my opinion, it is infinitely more safe to admit a hundred thousand immigrants who, though unable to read and write, seek among us only a home and opportunity to work...
It is Cleveland’s position on this matter that informs his mention of the open gates of America — gates that, naturally, also should have been open to those from East Asia.

I also appreciate how President Cleveland praised Liberty as the USA’s own pagan goddess, a much better object of worship. Thus, in his public speech at the inauguration for the Statue of Liberty, President Cleveland orates,
We are not here to day to bow before the representation of a fierce and war-like god, filled with wrath and vengeance, but we joyously contemplate instead, our own deity keeping watch and ward before the open gates of America, and greater than all that have been celebrated in ancient song. Instead of grasping in her hand thunderbolts of terror and of death, she holds aloft the light which illumines the way to man’s enfranchisement.

We will not forget that Liberty has here made her home; nor shall her chosen altar be neglected. Willing votaries will constantly keep alive its fires, and these shall gleam upon the shores of our sister republic in the East [France]. Reflected thence and joined with answering rays, a stream of light shall pierce the darkness of ignorance and man’s oppression, until liberty enlightens the world [boldface added].
Yes, Liberty has always stood for the application of her principles, foremost of which is the liberty to seek new opportunities in new lands. She stood for liberalized immigration at her opening ceremony. May she continue to stand for it today.

Tuesday, October 14, 2025

Online AI Image-Repackagers and the Libertarian Apologists for Their Art Theft

Such Libertarians Whitewash Regurgitative AI’s Copyright Infringements Not Because They Like the AI But Because They Wish to Erode Copyright Protections Further


Stuart K. Hayashi





There are tremendous issues with what is called “generative AI.” The issue is not with the technology as such, but with the unethical way in which it is being used — a use that the companies behind “generative AI” demand go unpunished by law. And that is a dilemma because it involves the violation of intellectual property rights (IPRs). And on account of their party line from the 1970s being one of undue hostility to IPRs, it is all too common for self-proclaimed libertarians to whitewash the harms being inflicted by the “generative AI” as it currently stands.

The usual people who make use of “generative AI” to produce images, which they call art, supply their own rationalizations for the theft. Artists on social media, such as on the Facebook/Meta Company’s platform Threads, frequently get into arguments with those users, whom they call “AI bros.” Yet such artists are unfamiliar with the rationalizations and motivations by IP-hating libertarians. Thus, when artists on social media come across IP-hating libertarians trying to whitewash “generative AI,” those artists mistake those IP-hating libertarians for the usual AI bros. However, in the context of their propaganda for “generative” AI’s copyright violations, both the motivations and some specific specious arguments of IP-hating libertarians are notably distinct from the AI bros’.

In this essay I shall explain the motivation behind the IP-hating libertarians’ insistence on shoving themselves into this controversy, and how it differs from the AI bros’ intentions. After that, I shall explain a particular specious argument from two IP-hating libertarian journalists who, unlike most IP-hating libertarians, are generally respected among more-mainstream people, such as those on the political center-Left. Then I shall expose the fallacy of that rationalization from the two IP-hating libertarian journalists.




“Generative” AI As Anything But
We begin with an explanation of how “generative AI” trashes intellectual property rights — and how the generative part of that name is a misnomer. Essentially, what happens is this. The user types in what sort of image he wants — an image that we are initially misled to believe comes fully formed out of nowhere. What the user types in is called a “prompt.” And then the image appears.

The truth is that the image does not come from nothing. Rather, what happens is this. The AI sends out “bots” or “crawlers” to crawl the World Wide Web to scrape for data. Upon finding data, such as a copyrighted visual image, the AI produces an exact copy of that image. This is misleadingly referred to as “training” of the AI. Human consumers of this product send prompts to the AI to deliver a new image. Upon this, the AI takes the data it stored and, through use of statistical probabilities, assembles an image derived from that data. This is highly commercialized. Users pay money to the AI companies for this service. Yet the artists who created the actual copyrighted visual images upon which this technology depends, receive no financial remuneration for the economic value that the AI company took from them, the value for which the AI company’s consumers pay to the AI company instead. The AI company did not even ask first for the copyright holders’ permission.

It is thus misleading to say that this technology is “generative.” Nay, it is derived nonconsensually from the economic value that other parties have created. As observed by novelist Maggie North, a more accurate term for this is “regurgitative AI.”

Nor are these, as they have been called, AI image-“generators.” They are image-repackagers. The digital artist Reid Southen notes at the 21-minute, 1-second timestamp, that it is misleading to say that with regurgitative AI, online artists are being expected to compete against a machine. Rather, online artists are expected to compete against “their own work” that has been stolen from them.

And it is not enough for these AI companies that they have been getting away with exactly copying copyrighted artworks absent of the owners’ permission. No, in various countries the AI companies want it codified into statute that copyrights cannot be enforced against AI companies amassing data in this manner. This would involve an expansion of what is known as the Text-and-Data-Mining exception. Previously, various countries have already enacted legislation proclaiming that search engines’ use of bots to crawl websites for data were not a form of copyright infringement. However, the AI companies demand that, in statute, their ability to copy copyrighted artworks completely also be covered under the exception. We shall return to this by the essay’s end.

A false comparison here, made both by AI bros and by IP-hating libertarians, in response to criticism is that the regurgitative AI is just doing what copyright-respecting artists have always done in creating new works inspired by other parties’ artworks that preceded them.

As I have written before, there is a vital distinction between copyright infringement versus one artwork being inspired by other parties’ artworks. IP-hating libertarians note the importance of artists having the freedom to make works greatly influenced by others’. But then those IP-hating libertarians do conflate artistic inspiration with copyright infringement. They do this to rationalize that copyright infringement is actually not bad after all. At the conclusion of this essay I will return to spelling out exactly what is wrong with that equivocation on the IP-hating libertarians’ part.

Here I will point out a crucial difference, though further explanation will have to wait until the end of this essay. For now, it will suffice to remember that when artists produce commercial artworks that still other, preceding artworks have inspired, the artists of the new commercial works do not rely on the production of exact copies of the older works against the consent of older works’ creators. By contrast, it is inherent to the commercial production of new images by the AI that it produces exact copies of the works from which the new images are assembled.

As long as this is done absent of the explicit consent of the owners of the copyrights on the original works the AI is using, the AI companies are indeed directly benefiting financially from the nonconsensual copying and pirating of copyrighted artwork. There are two important values that AI companies owe to copyright holders — first, the revenue accrued from the use of copies made in the data-scraping of the copyrighted artwork and, second and far more important, the ethical acquisition of permission from the copyright holders that should have been sought from the outset.

However, two well-respected, IP-hating libertarian journalists have a reply to this. They say that what the regurgitative AI is doing actually is the same, in principle, as artists making new artworks inspired by other artworks. The two IP-hating libertarian journalists say this is so because, if Artist Bob produces his own commercial work inspired by that of Artist Angela, Artist Bob does necessarily rely on making and storing an exact copy of Artist Angela’s artwork. You are justified in wondering how this possibly could be so. The two IP-hating libertarian journalists continue that the exact copy is stored in Artist Bob’s memory, in his brain. That claim is so asinine that it baffled me initially. That argument departs so substantially from even a remote understanding of memory and human psychology, that I was baffled how two men who are seemingly intelligent could make it.

But now I understand. The desire for IP-hating libertarians to rationalize their desire to undermine IP protection is so ingrained that they will engage in such mental gymnastics. These are two libertarians who claim to have advanced beyond the point of toeing the party line of Murray Rothbard and the other Rothbardians of the 1970s. But in their being latched onto the anti-IP talking points of the 1970s, these two well-respected libertarian journalists are indeed stuck in the party line.

As I said earlier, when artists trying to protect their own artwork come across IP-hating libertarians’ apologetics for regurgitative AI’s copyright theft, those artists usually mistake those IP-hating libertarians for the usual AI bros. I want to rectify that. The IP-hating libertarians pose a specific danger to artists that the usual AI bros do not. The IP-hating libertarians are horrifyingly influential among legal theorists at George Mason University, and I fear that they may even have influence over legal theorists at the University of Chicago. As I have written in previous essays (1, 2), the libertarians’ case against intellectual property relies primarily on a straw-man argument most influentially delivered by a Chicago-school economist. And, as mentioned at the 36-minute, 44-second timestamp, the IP-hating libertarians even have a strong influence over Clarence Thomas on the U.S. Supreme Court.

The vast majority of people in the industrialized world — even ones who have their own complaints about copyright enforcement on websites like YouTube — know better than to swallow the rationalizations of IP-hating libertarians. But as long as they have the ear of legal theorists at George Mason University and a U.S. Supreme Court justice, such IP-hating libertarians still have the power to inflict serious damage upon artists. And these IP-hating libertarians exert influence upon academic legal theorists and jurists in a manner that the run-of-the-mill AI bro does not.

That is why I give special attention to IP-hating libertarians. It is also why, when IP-hating libertarians weigh in on the issue of regurgitative AI’s copyright violations, I implore all artists protective of their work to learn what separates the IP-hating libertarians from the AI bros. (By conventional “AI bros,” I mean the customers of AI companies. I concede that, with his cozying up to Donald Trump, billionaire OpenAI executive Sam Altman also maintains a lot of clout.)

I am writing this essay to explain how the whitewashing of regurgitative AI’s copyright desecrations by IP-hating libertarians is motivated by a particular ideological passive-mindedness — even bigotry — that is uncommon even among the rationalizations of the AI bros. I intend to explain its origins and how this has led to the shockingly bizarre rationalizations of two respected libertarian journalists who, at first glance, seem to be the sort who should know better.




The Motives and Tactics of Those Who Actually Use Regurgitative AI — The “AI Bros” 
When it comes to AI bros who, on social media, very defensively rationalize their use of regurgitative AI and accuse objecting real artists of “gatekeeping,” the motivation and rationalizations are much simpler. These are people who once had a vague desire to create beautiful images from their own hands. However, they found such attempts too frustrating and discouraging, and they quit at it.

But when they first used regurgitative AI, it gave them the feeling that this was the closest they would get to knowing what it would be like for the implementation of their own aesthetic choices to result in a new visual image. Having given up on real visual art, this is the nearest that such people have felt to having come to acquire that sort of empowerment. But then real artists came and ruined that feeling by reproaching these AI bros’ use of the regurgitative AI. Hence, the AI bros have offered a plethora of rationalizations.

One of those rationalizations is that regurgitative AI “democratizes” the creation of visual art. By that standard, real artists who object to regurgitative AI are snooty elitists guilty of “gatekeeping.” But compared to many other pastimes, it’s relatively inexpensive to buy a pencil and paper and start drawing. Other than that the materials are usually purchased by their parents, this is something that is done by literally most four-year-olds. It’s difficult to name a pastime that has fewer and less obtrusive barriers to entry.

The fine arts are considered snooty and elitist in that, among those who use their hands to produce visual art, only a tiny minority have reached the point where the visual art can be called photorealistic. But the reason why this small number of people have reached that elite status is that they put in the effort to earn it. That is snooty and elitist only in the same way that anti-capitalists consider it snooty and elitist that, under free enterprise, the party that satisfies the marketplace demand of willing customers more successfully than others is the party that gets the richest.

Another rationalization is that regurgitative AI allows for disabled people to do art in a way that they could not have done in the more traditional methods. Actually, there are plenty of successful people in the fine arts who are disabled. And the AI bros who consistently make this argument, predictably enough, are people who are conventionally able-bodied.

And another favorite rationalization is one I have tackled before. It is that there is no such thing as artistic originality anyway, which makes art theft okay. In one of her “speed-paint storytime” YouTube videos, the online illustratrix “LavenderTowne” goes over this. Someone told her, “The fact remains that originality doesn’t exist. It’s something every type of artist knows and has known for a century.”

To that, LavenderTowne quips, “Dude, I missed that part in history class where 1920s flappers discovered that originality doesn’t exist.”

Following that quip, LavenderTowne does proceed to provide an argument that is more serious. With respect to the thought-terminating cliché that “All art makes use of already-established conventions, and therefore artistic originality has never existed,” you can also read my own refutation of it.

In her video, LavenderTowne also goes over and refutes several other AI bro rationalizations as well. I recommend it.

In the case of AI bros, the rationalizations are about trying to justify morally an action they have already become accustomed to engaging in. By contrast, I would not be surprised if the IP-hating libertarians who are apologists for regurgitative AI do not even use it. Instead of defending an action they already practice, the IP-hating libertarians who defend regurgitative AI are acting out of a desire to to adhere to an ideological doctrine and dogma to which they have already pledged allegiance and are reluctant to let go of. In the case of the two IP-hating libertarian journalists I intend to single out, they pride themselves on veering away from much of the dogma from the 1970s, but the obsession with denouncing IP is something they still insist on holding onto.




The Half-Century-Old Party Line That IP-Hating Libertarians Will Not Give Up On
Here is a brief history on the IP-hating libertarians from the late twentieth century onward.

As usual, the most fanatical positions taken by self-described libertarians can be traced in the late twentieth century to an economist named Murray N. Rothbard. When the Libertarian Party formed in the 1970s, and Rothbard was still a part of it, he made known his opposition to patent rights. He vocalized, though did not originate, the falsehood that a U.S. utility patent is a government-enforced monopoly on an industry, claiming to hold exclusive ownership over a general idea for a whole category of product. The late, prominent libertarian writer Roy A. Childs, Jr., too, is complicit in this.

Soon after, Wendy McElroy and Samuel Edward Conkin III — self-proclaimed “anarchists” like Rothbard — extended that denunciation and misconception to copyrighted artwork. They conflate an artwork — being a fleshed-out and fully rendered culmination of thousands of creative decisions — as a mere “idea,” as though it is the same in principle as a vague and hazy general idea not given a form by which it can be experienced through the senses.

They then put together the straw man that for an artist to claim ownership over the art she created — the art that is concretely experienced through interfacing with the senses — is to claim ownership over “ideas” in general, including vague hazy ideas of other people that are similar to the general premise of the artwork. As further stitches to their straw man, these IP-hating libertarians pronounce that for you to expect copyright protection over your original artwork is for you to attempt to use the government to police other people’s thoughts. In all seriousness, these IP-hating libertarians propound that copyrights are a form of censorship. One who embraced that standard would have to conclude that plagiarism is the exercise of free speech.

I have rebutted those falsehoods in essays here and here.

There have been two main strategies by which libertarians have tried to undermine intellectual property rights. The first is the blunter approach from the Ludwig von Mises Institute, the Foundation for Economic Education (FEE), and Liberty International (formerly the International Society for Individual Liberty). It consists of declaring outright that intellectual property rights are abhorrent and ought to be abolished altogether.

Frighteningly, this fanatical approach has been becoming more mainstream in recent years. We see this with two billionaires, Elon Musk and Twitter cofounder Jack Dorsey. Both of those men have stakes in regurgitative AI and have been hit with well-deserved copyright infringement lawsuits over it.

In response, Jack Dorsey bleated on Twitter, “Delete all IP law.”

To that, Elon Musk replied, “I agree.”

The folly of that tantrum is explained well by Raymond Van Dyke on the blog IP Watchdog, a blog I recommend highly.

Despite the cries for abolition of IP rights now being endorsed by famous billionaires, such fanaticism is, thankfully, still not entertained seriously by most people. For that reason, the libertarian think-tanks that are more sophisticated about the law and public policy exercise a strategy that is more subtle. This is what they do. They have lawyers keep tabs on court cases pertaining to IP enforcement, especially ones that have potential for setting new precedents on how far and how strictly IP enforcement can be applied in future cases. Then they come out with policy briefs and opinion pieces arguing that the court should deliver a ruling that sets a precedent to weaken the ability to enforce IP.

That is the modus operandi of the libertarian think tanks of Washington, D.C., especially visible (1, 2) from the Reason Foundation.

As they know better than to expect any immediate repeal of IP rights, their strategy is to weaken IP little by little.

The Rothbardians of the Mises Institute revile the Reason Foundation and the other D.C. think tanks for having lost interest in a number of Rothbard’s favorite talking points. Reason and the D.C. think tanks are not apologists for the Confederacy of the Civil War. Murray Rothbard, the Mises Institute, and Liberty International propagate the lie that the Confederation had the moral high ground over the Union. Reason and the D.C. think tanks are also not reflexively inclined to proclaim that every Third-World terrorist’s attack on the U.S. military is merely the innocent terrorist striking back against the U.S. military for being an evil empire. Worse to the Rothbardians, Reason and the D.C. think tanks are not full-throated in extolling the glories of anarcho-“capitalism” and “market” anarchy, an illogical and unjust model of society I refuted here.

And the Rothbardians of the Mises Institute fault Reason and the other D.C. think tanks for not calling for immediate destruction of IPRs. To the Mises Institute, the piecemeal approach of Reason and the other D.C. think tanks is a mealy-mouthed milquetoast position. Yet the approach of Reason and the other think tanks has made much more headway. As these think tanks’ adherents are strategically placed in the law and economics departments of George Mason University, it is the situation that Reason and the D.C. think tanks always have the ear of this college’s legal scholars.

As one of the most-cited straw-man arguments of these IP-hating libertarians also comes from a twentieth-century Chicago-school economist, I fear that the IP-hating libertarians’ rationalizations might have influence over the legal scholars of the University of Chicago as well. And intellectual property lawyer Adam Mossoff has pointed out that on account of GMU libertarians in general having an influence over U.S. Supreme Court justice Clarence Thomas, the rationalizations against IP rights have correspondingly influenced him. (Admittedly, with Clarence Thomas receiving undisclosed gifts from billionaires, I cannot rule out that Sam Altman and other AI executives might be a devil on his shoulder as well.)

The latest court cases that these IP-hating legal theorists have their eyes on are the copyright suits over regurgitative AI. That is why IP-hating libertarians have inserted themselves into arguments on Threads that online artists have been having against AI bros. Again, online artists too often mistake these IP-hating libertarians for AI bros. But many of these IP-hating libertarians do not use the regurgitative AI; their motives are different. And, again, the danger is that whereas internet-arguers who are customers to AI companies do not have sway over actual influential legal scholars, many IP-hating libertarians do.




Libertarian Journalists Nos. 1 and 2 Sounding Sane at First
That brings me to two libertarian journalists who come from the Reason Foundation sort of tradition. These two libertarian journalists are relatively well-respected, even by leftwing laymen who follow the news regularly. I will call them Journalist No. 1 and Journalist No. 2.

Journalist No. 1 ran a rather well-known website for philosophic essays pertaining to the libertarian movement and he now hosts a podcast for one of the more-benign remaining libertarian online periodicals, at which he serves a big editorial role. Unlike Reason magazine, this more-benign libertarian online periodical doesn’t plaster around Robby Soave’s smug smirk as he spreads COVID denialism and makes excuses for MAGA’s pathology and paranoia.

Journalist No. 2 once regularly wrote for Reason magazine. But, wisely, in 2024 on Threads he publicly condemned Reason magazine for its foolish whitewashing of MAGA. Journalist No. 2 noticed the psychological evasion on the part of Reason magazine’s editors in pretending that Kamala Harris’s fallacies on political economy and dunder-headed proposed government regulations were somehow at least as bad as — or somehow worse than — Donald Trump’s flagrant rejection of liberal republican Due Process and the rule of law.

There are big areas where both Journalists No. 1 and 2 have distanced themselves from many of the favorite public-policy positions of the Mises Institute and other worshipers of Murray Rothbard. Unlike most Rothbardians — including the vice president of international relations at Liberty International — these two do not whitewash the Confederation as having the moral high ground over Abraham Lincoln in the Civil War. They abhor the white supremacism of the Mises Institute. They criticize the Mises Institute’s bigotry concerning dark-skinned immigrants. And they take positions that most self-avowed libertarians — including those now running Reason magazine — detest as “Woke.”

It is to the credit of Journalist No. 1 that he dissents from transphobia. In attempt to ingratiate themselves to the Intellectual Dark Web that serves as apologist to Donald Trump, it has become near-uniform for libertarians to affirm agreement with all of the most popular denunciations of transgender people and their desire for equal treatment. Journalist No. 1, by contrast, has done podcast episodes where he has conducted interviews dispelling the misconceptions about transgender people that other libertarians have contributed to perpetuating.

Considering the many fanatical positions of the Rothbardians that Libertarian Journalists Nos. 1 and 2 have shied away from, it may be tempting to assume that Libertarian Journalists Nos. 1 and 2 are not fanatical themselves. Tragically, such an assumption would be wrong. The two remain devoted to the party line that the libertarian movement formed in the 1970s against intellectual property rights. They have bound themselves to the obligatory hostility to legitimate copyright enforcement. And they take the more gradualist position — rather than demand immediately the abolition of IP, they comment on the latest controversy over IP enforcement and then urge the weakening of that enforcement. Toeing that party line, Journalists No. 1 and 2 interject on the topic of regurgitative AI’s copyright infringements. And the argument they provide on it is astonishing in how ludicrous it is.




Libertarian Journalists Nos. 1 and 2 Bizarrely Misrepresenting Human Memory in Particular and Human Beings in General
First, Libertarian Journalists 1 and 2 make note of how, in scraping data of online images, the regurgitative AI will make and store an exact copy of the copyrighted image against the copyright holder’s consent. Then, in a very specious obscuring of context, Libertarian Journalists 1 and 2 say that that is exactly what every copyright-holding human artist does. They say that in learning to do fine art, the artist saw other copyrighted images and that her memory produced exact copies of the copyrighted images that she stored in her memory. Then, continue Libertarian Journalists Nos. 1 and 2, the artist’s own original works are simply a similar statistics-based reconstituting of other artists’ copyrighted works in the same manner that the regurgitative AI’s regurgitative image is a reconstituting of the images that the AI scraped.

Therefore, conclude Libertarian Journalists Nos. 1 and 2, artists who complain about their copyrights being infringed are hypocrites: the AI is doing exactly what those artists do. The implication is that all art is an unoriginal derivative of someone else’s, and therefore actual copyrighted art by human beings is not any less of a copyright infringement than is the output of regurgitative AI. That is not so much to defend regurgitative AI than it is to demean and undermine confidence in the recognition that any artwork deserves strict copyright enforcement at all. Again, the goal is not to call for the abolition of copyrights right away but instead to set a precedent that weakens confidence in, and the ability to enforce, copyrights in the future.

Libertarian Journalist No. 1 has made these assertions repeatedly on his blog and on Threads. Here is one example on the latter. He begins with the insincere hook — which all of his other online writings on this topic belie — “I’m sympathetic to the concern that there is something wrong with the way AI models are trained.” Then he gets to what he actually wants to convey.
But I’ve yet to see a persuasive case that (1) training them specifically constitutes theft of the training materials in a way that (2) doesn’t also entail that a human watching a bunch of movies, internalizing what they’ve learned, and creating new work inspired by them isn’t theft.

Many plainly convincing cases had already been made to Libertarian Journalist No. 1. He just wrote off those convincing cases immediately and arbitrarily because they did not match the conclusion to which he is already married. We can be diplomatic and say that his criteria for what does and doesn’t constitute something “convincing” are . . . idiosyncratic.

This is the same spiel that Libertarian Journalist No. 1 has been repeating over the course of months; perhaps over a year now. In June of 2024, he “asked” rhetorically, “...how is [regurgitative AI] training meaningfully distinct from your reading an article online and then your using the ideas you found to inform an article you write? Should you cut a check to the author of that article?”

And to his comrade, Libertarian Journalist No. 2 chimes in
My brain contains copies of many, many copyrighted works at a sufficient level of fidelity that they’d be infringing if I could somehow telepathically beam them to a hard drive. We just very reasonably choose not to apply copyright to brains.


Note the far-fetched boast on the part of Libertarian Journalist No. 2 that his own conscious autobiographical memory of a copyrighted artwork is exact to the same degree — or, as he says, “at a sufficient level of fidelity” — as a perfect digital copy of it. The dubious nature of Libertarian Journalist No. 2’s braggadocio, and that Libertarian Journalist No. 1 is not taken aback by a claim so stark in how it defies credulity, surprised me. Upon my initial reading of that exchange, I felt vicarious embarrassment for them both.

This argument from Journalists No. 1 and 2 is so out of touch with even the most rudimentary understanding of human psychology, artistic ability, and the body’s motor functions inhering in art-making, that it makes Journalists No. 1 and 2 themselves sound not like humans but like an AI — and an AI of an already-obsolete model, ready for the junk heap, at that.




How Human Memory Actually Works, and How That Makes It a Less Effective Tool for Copyright Infringement Than Does Regurgitative AI 
Those of us who aren’t as braggadocious about our memory ability as Libertarian Journalist No. 2 can consider an informal experiment that psychology professor Robert Epstein has conducted over the decades with his students. In the decades where his students saw and handled one-dollar bills daily, Epstein asked these students to draw a one-dollar bill from memory. He wanted the students to fill in as many details as possible. As noted by evolutionary biology professor Kenneth Miller in his book The Human Instinct, the “sketches” that Epstein received from his students,
not surprisingly, were pretty rudimentary. Most of them had poorly drawn portraits of George Washington in the middle, the number “one” written out several times, and some even had representations of symbols looking something like the seal of the U.S. Treasury. But none of them came even close to a faithful copy of the currency.
One of those former students, Jinny Hyun, was an especially talented illustratrix. First Epstein asked her to draw one-dollar bill from memory. Then Epstein asked her to draw a second version in which she was able to look directly at a one-dollar bill in front of her as a reference. The first drawing was primitive and basic compared to the second. You can see the comparison over here. As Kenneth Miller notes from this, all of Epstein’s “students had seen dollar bills countless times, of course, and yet none of them could execute a drawing that was even close to reality.”

In implicit contrast to the false equivalence provided by Libertarian Journalist No. 2, Kenneth Miller paraphrases the conclusion to which Robert Epstein arrived through this experiment. Should you 
“show” a dollar bill to a computer by means of a scan or a digital photo,...a realistic image of the bill will be stored in that computer virtually forever. When it is “recalled” from computer memory and sent to a digital printer, the image will outshine even the very best sketch that a human being can make from the “memory” in our brain. [Kenneth R. Miller, The Human Instinct: How We Evolved to Have Reason, Consciousness, and Free Will, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2018), 140.]
For all his braggadocio about the “fidelity” of his memory, I would be surprised if Libertarian Journalist No. 2 could do better than Jinny Hyun’s first attempt at drawing a one-dollar bill from memory.

A strong and relatively vivid memory of a particular sight, sound, or other sensation is part of what is called autobiographic memory. If you have committed to heart the plot and dialogue from a beloved movie, that is autobiographic memory at work. More specifically, that involves semantic memory, which is general knowledge, and episodic memory, which is memory of events and the sensations relating to such experiences. But much of those, especially the latter, are subsumed into the larger category of autobiographic memory. With exceptions that are freakishly rare — and I will address that later — even the people with the strongest autobiographic, semantic, and episodic memories cannot produce in their minds a replica of someone else’s art to the exactitude that Libertarian Journalist No. 2 blithely assumes. 

That is the reason why there is such a psychological phenomenon as the Mandela Effect, where people think they remember a detail of the past so strongly and yet that detail turns out inaccurate. A famous example is that they strongly remember the children’s books being titled The Berenstein Bears instead of The Berenstain Bears with an a in the -stain where they expected an e to be. Even real artists with very strong autobiographic, semantic, and episodic memories are often bedeviled by the Mandela Effect, giving the lie to Libertarian Journalist No. 2’s conceit that his “brain contains copies of many, many copyrighted works at a sufficient level of fidelity that they’d be infringing” on copyright if he could “telepathically beam” those memories “to a hard drive.”

As I will explain soon, even the extremely rare people with memories as strong as what Libertarian Journalist No. 2 claims to have are people who cannot reproduce other people’s artworks manually with their own paint brushes and other art supplies if they have not practiced, for years, the same artistic medium as any work that they could possibly intend to copy. That is because for an actual artist to reproduce another’s work with the same degree of fidelity as the regurgitative AI is capable, the would-be copycat artist must fulfill an additional requirement. For the would-be copycat artist to succeed at being a copycat, she must employ another form of memory that Libertarian Journalists No. 1 and 2 have not mentioned, and which they are apparently trying to conflate with autobiographic memory.

There is an extremely small number of people on Earth — fewer than one-hundred documented — that do have perfect autobiographic, semantic, and episodic memories. And at least one very high-profile one even is an artist. That is the actress Marilu Henner. She has proven to psychologists that she is able to remember the exact and minute details of events she observed from decades past. She has given details of memories of a particular day’s events from years earlier and, when psychologists have investigated those details, they always check out.

I doubt, however, that Libertarian Journalist No. 2 is among one of those one-hundred people with perfect autobiographic, semantic, and episodic memories. The chances of that are less than 1 in 80 million.

And even with her perfect autobiographic memory, if Marilu Henner tried to produce a perfect copy of a work she observed that involved artistic media other than acting, and which she had not been practicing for years, she would not succeed. That is on account of the fact that artists who have strong autobiographic, semantic, and episodic memories still rely on another form of memory both in their original works and in imitations — another form of memory, one that that Libertarian Journalists Nos. 1 and 2 have ignored, and which regurgitative AI bypasses in its own imitations of copyrighted works.

That other form of memory is “muscle memory.” Autobiographic, semantic, and episodic memory are held on the conscious level, and that is not enough for an artist to reproduce manually the work of another. That, and all professional-level real art, requires the acquisition and exercise of muscle memory not through conscious memorizing with one’s cerebrum but subconsciously through consistent practice as the artist moves other parts of her body.

Consider the “Get What You Deserve” speech that Joaquim Phoenix delivers in the movie Joker. Many of the movie’s fans felt inspired by that speech and committed it to memory — their autobiographic, semenatic, and episodic memories. If I committed that speech to memory and video-recorded myself reciting it, it would not duplicate Joaquim Phoenix’s performance in such a manner that Warner Brothers would identify it as infringement on the movie studio’s copyright. Even aside from my inborn physical differences from Joachin Phoenix, such as my nose being shaped differently from his, my reciting the speech would result in my using a different tone, in my vocal inflections being different, and the gestures of my upper body being dissimilar.

Comparing, side by side, Joachim Phoenix’s performance against my verbatim recitation of his speech, you would notice that Phoenix is a pro whereas I am worse than an amateur. All of those nuances, which eventually add up to a powerful effect, are part of the muscle memory for which Libertarian Journalists Nos. 1 and 2 have neglected to account.

If, through his own muscle memory and use of traditional art supplies like paintbrushes, Professional Artist No. 2 did successfully produce an exact copy of Professional Artist No. 1’s copyrighted work against her consent, then Artist No. 1 would be right to sue him. But the costly demands of an actual artist building up muscle memory to that point has made it relatively unusual for real artists to infringe upon one another so blatantly. Hence, while this sort of unauthorized duplication has always been a problem and worry, it was something that, relatively speaking, real artists have not had to worry as much about. Note that with both her perfect autobiographic memory and acting experience, Marilu Henner is one of the handful of people on Earth who could reproduce Joachim Phoenix’s body language perfectly if she delivered her own rendition of his “Get What You Deserve” speech. And note that even she does not infringe on copyright in the way that Libertarian Journalist No. 2 insinuates that all artists do in practice.

By contrast, regurgitative AI bypasses the limitations of muscle memory in humans. For that reason, regurgitative AI makes it cheaper to infringe on copyrighted works through accurate duplications, making it likelier that these forms of piracy will occur on a much larger scale than before. As a consequence, real artists — whom Libertarian Journalist No. 1 tries to gaslight for being “arrogant” gatekeepers — are, in fact, entirely reasonable in worrying about abuses from this new threat.




IP-Hating Libertarians Getting Something They Deserve
Fortunately the tech journalist Brian Penny, whom I think is politically center-Left, gives Libertarian Journalists Nos. 1 and 2 the ridicule they have rightfully earned. In reply he posts,
Absolutely nobody in the history of humanity ever once learned anything by consuming billions to trillions of hours of anything and then magically becoming an instant expert. That is a myth, and it’s a dumb one. You’ve surely read at least one book or heard one interview in your life talking about people practicing and getting better over time by doing, not by sitting still and binging billions to trillions of hours. . . . You can’t be serious.

As for stealing, go into Walmart right now and start reading every book or watching every DVD. Report back how many you get through before they approach you for theft. Your perspective is too derpy...even [to] be believable.🤦‍♂️🤦‍♂️🤦‍♂️
To reinforce the point further, Brian Penny had some visual aid. On the right for a Threads post he had a professional artist’s illustration of the Marvel Comics character Wolverine. On the left was Mr. Penny’s own amateurish and crude drawing of the same character — the sort he would have done at age four. With that illustration, Mr. Penny calls attention,
If watching a bunch of X-Men movies and the animated series and reading their comics and playing with their action figures growing up made me an artist, then why does my Wolverine look like an underdeveloped child drew it?

Mine is the head on the left 😹😹😹 the one on the right was what AI bros keep telling me I need to stare at to learn like a human.
Mr. Penny was correct in all of that except for his assumption that Libertarian Journalists Nos. 1 and 2 are conventional AI bros rather than ideologues who don’t even use regurgitative AI and are instead still trapping themselves in this part of Rothbardian dogma from the 1970s. When I first read the works of Libertarian Journalists Nos. 1 and 2, I thought they were too smart to believe in something as absurd as what they have stated seriously on this topic. But rationalizations so absurd are what allegedly intelligent people fall into when they will not release themselves from this dogma that does nothing but begrudge our intellectual property rights.

Libertarian Journalist No. 1 has also repeatedly said that regurgitative AI imagery is the same, in principle, as search engines sending out bots and crawlers over websites to gather data on them, all without the permission of those websites. That, too, is false. When owners of websites withhold permission from search engines to obtain particular data, the websites’ codes contain what are called robots.txt exclusion protocols. When a website possesses a robots.txt protocol, the search engine abides by it. By contrast, as shown in this NPR piece, the regurgitative AI’s bots flagrantly disregard and bypass the robots.txt protocol. This indicates that the businessmen who own the regurgitative AI are aware that they do not have permission to scrape data, and then they do it anyway. No, Libertarian Journalist No. 1, contrary to your assumptions, it is not the same in principle at all.

Again, one of the AI bros’ favorite rationalizations is that “AI democratizes art.” It definitely has not, but that word does describe something related that is far more important and far more interesting. Digital technology truly has enabled a human being of relatively modest financial means to create and upload digital content. On account of such technology, the number of people creating their own genuinely original videos, and uploading those videos, has increased substantially since the year 2005. To the degree that the digital technology enabled that person to be the party making most of the creative choices directly, that technology has truly has helped to democratize content-creation. First dibs on ownership of such a piece of content must rightfully go to its creator. Hence, insofar as it has helped regular people — not only corporation-backed professionals — produce and distribute content, the technology has helped democratize copyrights themselves, the same copyrights that AI firms are now trying to deny.

In short, digital technology — AI and all the rest — has not democratized artistic skill. Artistic skill remains the exclusive province of those who put in the years of practice. Digital technology has, however, democratized intellectual property rights themselves, the very property rights that AI bros and libertarians wish to erase.

Use of this regurgitative AI will not be ethical until the data on which it “trains” come exclusively from copyright holders who offer explicit permission in an opt-in system. That is, absent of the explicit permission, the data are not to be used. Until such time, we can only hope that, in defiance of Libertarian Journalists Nos. 1 and 2 and the Reason Foundation’s essays urging otherwise, actual reason prevails and the artists win their civil suits against the corporate owners of the regurgitative AI.

On that note, I can end this essay with some good news. Earlier I mentioned that AI companies are lobbying the governments of many countries to expand their respective Text-and-Data-Mining exceptions statutorily to cover AI copying of copyrighted artworks, immunizing these companies against such lawsuits. Fortunately, good sense prevailed in Australia, as that country’s government publicly recognized that no such Text-and-Data-Mining exception should exempt AI companies from the rightful consequences of their infringements.

I learned of this from German animatrix Kim McMahon. In her YouTube video on this subject, she read out loud Russh magazine’s paraphrasing of the Australian government’s astute evaluation: “...copyright is not a barrier to progress, but a foundation of both creative and digital economies.” If we are to clean up the mess of AI slop, then more of this sage thinking is what we need.   





On Saturday, December 13, 2025, I added the points about the Australian government and the call to expand the Text-and-Data-Mining exception. I also added the image of Libertarian Journalist No. 1 making his sarcastic crack and straw-man about remembering ideas from an article and therefore having to cut a check to the author. On Tuesday, February 3, 2026, I embedded into this post Brandon Sanderson’s speech “We Are the Art.” On Friday, May 22, and Saturday, May 23, 2026, I added the section concerning Robert Epstein’s informal experiment where he asked his students to draw a one-dollar bill from memory. I learned of this experiment from Kenneth Miller’s book.

Wednesday, February 26, 2025

Great Artists Don’t Steal — They Originate

Stuart K. Hayashi



Steve Jobs was wise in many ways but, to his everlasting detriment, he popularized one of Silicon Valley’s most nauseating clichés and misconceptions. “Good artists copy, great artists steal.” Jobs misattributed this saying to Pablo Picasso. The expression itself does not come from Picasso, though he did say something similar. The painter Françoise Gilot, a colleague to that well-known cubist, remembers him saying, “When there’s anything to steal, I steal.”

The expression actually comes from the poet T. S. Eliot, though he qualified the expression more than Jobs did. The quotation is found in one of Eliot’s essays in his volume The Sacred Wood where he reviews literary scholar Alfred Cruickshank’s monograph on playwright Philip Massinger. Cruickshank argues that Massinger very artfully pays homage to conventions set by William Shakespeare. Eliot disagrees, considering Massinger’s work a low-quality pastiche of the bard. In that context, Eliot says,
One of the surest of tests is the way in which a poet borrows. Immature poets imitate; mature poets steal; bad poets deface what they take, and good poets make it into something better, or at least something different. The good poet welds his theft into a whole of feeling which is unique, utterly different from that which it was torn; the bad poet throws it into something which has no cohesion. A good poet will borrow from authors remote in time, or alien in language, or diverse in interest. [George] Chapman [poet, playwright, and professor of Stoic philosophy] borrowed from [ancient-Roman Stoic philosopher] Seneca; Shakespeare and [poet John] Webster from [seventeenth-century French philosopher Michel de] Montaigne. . . . Massinger, as Mr. Cruickshank shows, borrows from Shakespeare a good deal [although, unlike Cruickshank, Eliot argues that Massinger did a poor job of it; emphasis added].
Despite Eliot’s use of the word steal, Eliot’s original quotation does partially concede — albeit cringingly — that there is some degree of originality after all, though Eliot insists on apologizing for it as a “good” form of “theft.” Even that reluctant concession is removed from Steve Jobs’s iteration. That makes Steve Jobs’s the dumbed-down version. To quote Eliot myself, in this instance Jobs is being a “bad poet.” Jobs borrowed from Eliot, making the quotation a bit “different from that which it was torn,” yet still the opposite of “better.”

Altogether, “good artists copy, great artists steal” is said today with insinuations that are both misleading and cynical. For that reason, this cliché deserves to go out of circulation. It is especially disheartening that the cliché is most popular in Silicon Valley, a place once associated with progress and innovation — neither of which can exist if there is no originality.

The immediate question to address is why I would object to this cliché when the steal is not meant to be taken literally. Steve Jobs and T. S. Eliot did not mean that they engaged in literal theft. Nor is that meant by the many Silicon Valley engineers who recite the cliché. But consider what the cliché implies. It mentions only two categories of artist, “good” and “great.” It says good artists “copy,” meaning that originality on their part is to be de-emphasized. But what about the other category, the “great artists”? In contrast to the “good artists,” the “great artists steal.”

Even as the cliché is said with one’s tongue in one’s cheek, the intention is still to presume that originality must not be considered as an option or even a possibility. That conspicuous omission is similar to the cliché of people saying that what defines your personality as an adult was either your “nature,” meaning inborn biological drives, or “nurture,” the influence that people other than yourself had exerted upon you in the past. The fact that you have free will, and that your personality as an adult is primarily the result of whom you choose to be, is not acknowledged as an option in “nature versus nurture.” Likewise, the upshot of “Good artists copy, great artists steal” is that either you are unoriginal or you are unoriginal, and there is no other alternative.

The insinuation is that originality is nonexistent or, at best, overrated. That insinuation is frequently cited as a rationalization for Silicon Valley companies gaining reputations for having invented particular new product features themselves when they had taken those features unacknowledged from elsewhere.

T. S. Eliot’s misleading phrasing is repeated by Austin Kleon in his book Steal Like an Artist. According to Kleon, as even works hailed for originality still follow some conventions, every act of creativity constitutes “theft.” The real distinction, says Kleon, is that there is “good theft” versus “bad theft.” Here, Kleon clunkily rephrases Eliot’s dichotomy, making Kleon’s version itself a form of “bad theft.” “Bad theft,” per Eliot, is when someone takes attributes of others’ works to create something inferior. That is what Kleon calls a “rip-off.” By contrast, when you mix other people’s styles and methods together to create something of high quality — perhaps even surpassing the source material — that is not a rip-off but what Kleon says is much better: a “re-mix.”

Various YouTube videos on artistic inspiration gladly repeat Kleon and therefore conclude, “Buddy, nothing is original, or at least not quote-unquote ‘original’ like you think it is.” You can see such videos denying originality-as-such over here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here and here. There are even TEDx Talks promulgating as much, as you can see here, here here, and here. People who utter lines like that always do so in a self-congratulatory manner, as if they are giving an insight of the utmost philosophic profundity. It makes sense for these people to say nothing is original when they themselves all sound alike. And the pretentiousness is sometimes accompanied with lines like, We humans want to believe we are so ingenious that we can come up with great ideas out of nowhere, but that is sheer hubris. Hence, goes the assertion, by confessing that there is no true originality — only re-mixes at best — we as a species are finally learning some much-needed humility. The philosophic YouTube video essayist Thomas Rebour airs those sentiments overtly in the conclusion of his own work on the topic.

The social-media-influencer and businesswoman Simrand Anand is not as pompous about this as is Thomas Rebour’s YouTube video. Still, on the social medium Threads, Ms. Anand does insist that developments that make truly important impacts in life actually are “not original. It’s just synthesis. That’s the magic. Synthesis is the real game now.” Fittingly enough, she is yet another TEDx Talks speaker. And she adds, “No one starts from scratch. Everyone is remixing.” That part is less synthesis or re-mix than just regular repetition of others.

Aristotle already pointed out that works celebrated as original do still have properties that are familiar and conventional. But, as we shall see later in this essay, the presence of those familiar-and-conventional properties do not negate the presence of originality. Nor should the presence of those familiar-and-conventional properties be cited — as the aforementioned people do — as an excuse to pronounce what are outright slights against the virtue of originality.

The YouTube vlogger Thoughty2 says, “The inception of a one-hundred-percent unique idea is not possible.” For that reason, he titles his YouTube video, “In Your Lifetime You'll Never Think of an Original Idea.”

Likewise, marketing expert Tom Sargent pronounces, “Once you accept ‘originality’ is basically a well-dressed lie, you can stop agonizing over ‘being unique.’ ”

Branding expert Rachel Lee adds, “There is no such thing as originality in terms of ideas, concepts, styles. There’s nothing you can create that hasn’t been created in some similar way, shape, or form.”

“Was there a point in history,” says “Erografos,” “where humans had original ideas? My personal opinion is ‘no.’”

The vlogger “Propeller Duck” begins his own video, “The concept of a completely original idea in the modern age is an often-sought-after concept despite the fact that it’s utterly impossible and, frankly, has been since the birth of modern civilization and art itself.”

I will give you an example of someone proposing an idea that, prior to its own proposition, was unprecedented for all of human history: the existence of airwaves. Except for light — which the first conceiver of airwaves had found to be an airwave having taken a special form — preindustrial humans could not detect airwaves by means of smell, taste, touch, hearing, or sight directly. However, we know that airwaves other than light do exist because radios, television sets, walkie-talkies, satellite communicators, mobile phones, and wireless internet modems rely on them to function — they rely on the sending of data signals through the airwaves. Microwave ovens also rely on airwaves, as do compass needles, X-rays, and radar. Were it the case that no airwaves other than light existed, these machines would not operate. We cannot see or hear non-light airwaves, but we can see and hear their practical effects.

In 1865, a true Scotsman named James Clerk Maxwell considered various natural phenomena that had stumped the greatest thinkers, phenomena that only a handful of scientists thought were related to one another. He devised an integrated theory that would account for all of these phenomena. This was his theory of the spectrum of electromagnetic radiation — also known as airwaves. Then in 1888, the German scientist Heinrich Hertz conducted experiments that demonstrated the veracity of Maxwell’s theory, proving that airwaves exist.

Ancient people’s tales of unseen spirits and gods affecting the material realm is not an anticipation of the discovery of airwaves — these invisible spirits were said to be conscious and have emotions, and to be able to choose to change their behavior. By contrast, airwaves are wholly impersonal and operate according to consistent principles of Nature.

It is true, again, that Maxwell proposed this theory to account for various phenomena that scientists had observed in the past, sometimes even centuries prior. Maxwell’s theory accounts for observations about static electricity that Thales offered in ancient Greece. The existence and nature of airwaves also account for the fact, discovered by ancient Song-dynasty Chinese sailors, that the needle of a compass points north. And ancient Greeks such as Aristotle did talk of an invisible and impersonal force in the air that they called “ether,” and Maxwell himself hypothesized over it. But, despite ancient people making observations concerning static electricity, lightning, and magnetization, they did not think of these as integral to their idea of “ether.” Maxwell went to his death believing in “ether,” but Albert Einstein proved that scientific acceptance of the existence and properties of airwaves does not rely at all on believing in “ether.”

Other physicists such as Michael Faraday, André-Marie Ampère, and Carl Gauss preceded Maxwell by decades in making then-considered-separate observations that there must be principled relationships between electricity and magnetism, and, hence, these men each discovered and described specific scientific laws concerning these relationships. Prior observations about the connection of electricity to magnetism were made by William Thomson, who would later be known as Lord Kelvin. Here, the originality-deniers can point to those older observations to proclaim that Maxwell’s theory was not original after all. But that is part of originality-denial’s manipulative mind-game, where emphasis is placed on the familiar-and-conventional aspects to overshadow the aspect that is novel. The originality-deniers would say that because Maxwell’s theory is to account for phenomena that prior scientists had discovered and were still puzzled by, Maxwell’s theory is nothing beyond a “re-mix” of the other scientists’ work. And to try to minimize this insight of Maxwell’s in such a way is churlish. Maxwell’s theory was an integration of much-older ideas and observations, yet the integration itself was startingly new.

André-Marie Ampère, Carl Gauss, and Michael Faraday each preceded Maxwell in devising specific equations to describe the relationships between electricity and magnetism, but it was Maxwell who conceived of there being invisible and usually-undetectable airwaves that would provide a unifying explanation for all of these phenomena. And in his calculations, Maxwell found that all electro-magnetic waves travel at the speed of light. As nothing but light could travel at that speed, Maxwell deduced by Aristotelian syllogism that light itself must be an electro-magnetic wave. Also by Aristotelian syllogism, Maxwell deduced that electricity, magnetism, and light all consisted of the same basic type of force. That insight about light being connected to electricity and magnetism had not been anticipated even by Ampère, Gauss, or Faraday.

(This video notes the ways in which electricity, magnetism, and light are similar and where they differ. All of them pertain to the activity of electrons. Electricity is the result of electrons changing location. Magnetism is created when electrons spin in the same direction as one another. And light is created by the state of electrons being altered from higher to lower, resulting in the release of photons.)

To conduct his his own experiment that proved Maxwell’s theory, Hertz had his own special equipment. Hertz reasoned that if Maxwell’s theory was correct, then Hertz would be able to transmit sparks — signals — wirelessly from one machine (a transmitter) to another device (a receiver). The transmitter was an induction coil, and the receiver was a copper wire. The goal would be to use the induction coil to send signals that caused the copper wire to spark. As the copper wire was not connected by any material object to the induction coil, there would be no means by which Hertz could transmit electrical signals to the copper wire unless the signals could be sent over the invisible electro-magnetic radiation waves as described by Maxwell. And that is what Hertz accomplished.

(In the experimental sample, the induction coil and copper wire were close enough to one another so that, if Maxwell were right, the signals could be sent through the airwaves. By contrast, in the control sample, the induction coil and copper wire were further from one another — so much so that, even if Maxwell were correct, no signal should be sent. Had the copper wire been sparked even in the control sample, that would have told Hertz that his sparks were caused by something other than the presence of airwaves.)

This experiment was inspired by a happy accident. Hertz originally acquired the induction coil and copper wire to conduct a different experiment on gases. When he tried that other experiment, Hertz noticed that when he sent electricity through the induction coil, the copper wire would spark soon afterward, despite the induction coil and copper wire not touching one another. Many other people — even some scientists — would have chalked that up to some odd fluke and moved on, simply remaining focused on the initial plan. But Hertz remembered what he had heard of Maxwell’s theory of airwaves, and wondered if perhaps it was through these invisible electromagnetic waves that the induction coil was sending energy to the copper wire. He was thus inspired to set up the experiment I described earlier, and repurposed the induction coil and the copper wire for that. In the early twentieth century, there was a saying: “ ‘Fortunate accidents’ are what happen to those who are wise enough to take advantage of them.” That applies here, being a much wiser saying than “Good artists copy, great artists steal.”

I should note that someone else we shall hear from — Alexander Graham Bell — conducted a similar experiment eight years before Hertz. In his own experiment, Bell successfully transmitted data over a beam of light. As light is a type of airwave that has taken on a particular form, this means that, technically, Bell successfully transmitted signals over airwaves before Hertz did. However, Bell did not know that he had proven Maxwell’s model to be accurate, nor was Bell’s experiment trying to test Maxwell’s model. Instead, Bell was trying to see if he could devise a form of telecommunications other than his landline telephone. Bell’s experiment did presage modern telecommunications technology, as the transmission of data over beams of light is the principle behind the fiber-optic cables in our computer systems. Bell’s achievement here is important as well, but Hertz is the one who has rightfully been honored for having very intentionally and explicitly proven Maxwell’s model by means of experiment.

Maxwell’s mental integration here is something other than a “re-mix” of the ideas that served as its foundation. In conception and application it transcends the sum of its parts, providing a net gain in our ability to understand Nature and thereby derive practical benefits from such understanding.

One might try to make the excuse that in saying “Good artists copy, great artists steal,” one is merely trying to be cute and clever and not trying to belittle originality. According to this excuse, the importance of originality is common knowledge — so much so that there is no need to explicate it. Hence, goes the rationalization, when someone says, “Good artists copy, great artists steal,” it causes surprise exactly because most listeners would expect to hear about artists being original, only for the expected consideration to be omitted. But that rationalization does not withstand scrutiny. In that sort of phrasing, the implication is still the same as T. S. Eliot’s “Immature poets imitate, mature poets steal.” The insinuation is that all artists have but two choices that are, respectively, 1) use the work of others in a mediocre fashion or 2) the use the work of others in a fashion that is better than mediocre. The insinuation is still to undercut the concept of originality and its stature.

If it were true that some Silicon Valley engineers just wanted to say “Good artists copy, great artists steal” to sound witty, they would have just said it a few times and then most everyone would have forgotten about it. Instead, the slogan endures in that region and industry exactly because those engineers do believe it articulates some deeper fundamental truth and principle that deserves to be applied. That YouTube is littered with intellectual videos with titles proclaiming the nonexistence of originality — with at least four TEDx Talks echoing that conclusion — is a testament to this idea having currency amid the zeitgeist.

This brings to mind that, besides the denial of originality overall, there is a second, somewhat-different-but-still-related interpretation of “Great artists steal.” Those who whitewash the second interpretation say that the cliché is not about denying originality completely but instead about stressing the success of entrepreneurs who apply a “Second-Mover Approach to Innovation” rather than a “First-Mover” approach. The interpretation is that when a business financially succeeds in acquainting its customers with a relatively new category of product, often that successful business is neither the technology’s inventor nor even the first business to place that technology on the market.

On that interpretation, the point of “Good artists copy, great artists steal” is not to deny that, in the case of personal computers, the graphical user interface and the mouse were invented by one innovative party, but to stress that it was the second mover, Steve Jobs at Apple Computer, and not the original inventor who gained business success from these developments.

There is much that is wrong even with that second interpretation of “great artists steal,” and its fallacies are derivative of the fallacies in the first interpretation. For most of this essay, I will focus on the originality-denial interpretation. Near the close of this essay I shall return to discussing the second interpretation, of the “second-mover advantage.”

And, when it comes to the first interpretation, there are many people who call themselves free-market libertarians who take the “Good artists copy, great artists steal” rationalization even farther.

Since the 1970s, the party line of the libertarian movement, in contrast to the Objectivist movement, has been to denigrate intellectual property rights (IPRs). It started with economist Murray Rothbard saying that patents are State-enforced monopolies of an industry and therefore should not exist. Then Wendy McElroy and Samuel Edward Conkin III added that the same accusation applies to copyrights on literature and other forms of art.

Excepting the Objectivist movement, the opposition to intellectual property rights continues to this day. And, as we shall see later, there are even a few self-described Objectivists who demean and deny the very concept of originality. The only differences among libertarians in opposition to IPRs is that there are factions who exploit different tactics in undermining them. The more openly-radical anarcho-“capitalists,” such as those at Liberty International (formerly the International Society for Individual Liberty, ISIL); Auburn, Alabama’s Ludwig von Mises Institute; and New York’s Foundation for Economic Education (FEE), say outright that they want IPRs abolished.

However, more-cautious people at libertarian think tanks in Washington, D.C., and Virginia, such as the Reason Foundation, know that such fanaticism is unpersuasive to most people, unpersuasive even to YouTube vloggers who rant about big media companies accusing their YouTube vlogs of copyright infringement. Hence, the more-cautious libertarians of D.C. think tanks have a different approach. They seldom spell it out that they want IPRs eliminated altogether. Instead, they watch for high-profile court cases that they anticipate will set precedents on where particular boundaries will be placed when it comes to how courts ascertain whether one party violated another’s IP. Any time the court case may set a precedent that will weaken, in future cases, the ability of plaintiffs to enforce their copyright, the D.C. libertarian think-tanks send out essays arguing for that weakening.

In their arsenal, such libertarians have myriad rationalizations for mischaracterizing IPRs as oppressive. I have refuted most of those rationalizations here.

Among the rationalizations is the following. It is that it is presumptuous and false for some party to claim to be the objectively discernible originator of some technological breakthrough or artwork. Some of the IPR-haters say that many parties simultaneously invented the innovation at the exact same time, which means no one party can rightfully claim to be the originator. And there are libertarian patent-haters who add that this alleged fact of “simultaneous invention” points to particular technological developments being inevitable. In that interpretation — such as what is argued by Kevin Kelly, one of Wired magazine’s founding editors — there is a “determinism” to the development of technologies. That would mean that technological progress is teleological, working toward some end-goal —an End of History — that is beyond any individual person’s control. Some Rothbardian patent-haters have seized on this to insinuate that every technological development came not from the initiative of some innovative party but instead was the result of the human collective, of many people in general and no one party in particular. Ergo, the argument goes, patents and copyrights should not exist.

Although he is not a libertarian and does not go as far as pronouncing that IPRs should be abolished, one very famous writer to make this case about “simultaneous invention” is Malcolm Gladwell in The New Yorker.

And that argument — including Malcolm Gladwell’s rendition of it — smacks around a straw man. A U.S. utility patent does not claim ownership over a general idea for a general category of product, such as “paperclip.” Rather, the U.S. utility patent is on a specific presentation, delineation, or application in the function that is often within an already-existing category of product. That is why, from 1867 to 1957, the U.S. Patent-and-Trademark Office granted at least 17 U.S. utility patents to at least 16 different parties for paperclips. It is also why each of these U.S. utility patents was granted prior to the expiration of the previous one.


Nor is it true — contrary to Malcolm Gladwell — that multiple parties arrive at the exact same invention at the exact same time. Rather, what happens is that different parties each — separated from one another by spans of time that are relatively short — independently arrive at general ideas that are similar. There have always been differences, however, in the specifics of how each party implements that general idea or general principle. When these separate parties litigate their IPRs, the dispute is over the areas where their different presentations and designs overlap one another. The traditional solution has been for these separate parties to take these areas of overlap and pool them into a single joint trust. Even if there are similar inventions wrought from five separate parties, it does not follow that the inventions should be in the public domain. If these five parties, each currently antagonistic toward the others, can each make a valid case to have contributed to invention, it does not follow — contrary to the Rothbardians’ assumptions — that parties outside of these five are entitled to unauthorized duplication of the new presentations and designs at the expense of the R-and-D performed by the five inventive parties.

Hence, if these five parties can each honestly claim to have contributed to invention, the fact that their number exceeds one still fails to invalidate the properness of enforcing patents.

I have addressed, in greater detail, the “government-enforced monopoly” falsehood and the “simultaneous-invention” red herring over here.

And when it comes to the attempt to deny originality itself, the falsehood is worse still. The attempt to deny originality is a rationalization cited to counter the fact that when separate parties arrive at similar delineations and designs, they can simply pool their patents. The originality-deniers proclaim that the identities of the originators of an innovation cannot be isolated just to five parties, or even twenty parties, or even 135 parties. Rather, continues the false premise, innovations just come down to general “ideas,” and general “ideas” are just in-the-air. According to this fallacy, the specific originators of an innovation cannot be identified objectively, and so, for all intents and purposes, control over specific original and practicable demand-satisfying designs and presentations should be in the public domain and not isolated to the specific parties that invested their scarce resources into the R-and-D that led these parties to find the most practicable such design. You can see such an insinuation over here.

And the cliché of “Good artists copy, great artists steal” is sometimes cited in the delivery of that fallacious rationalization. Even when “good artists copy, great artists steal” is not said explicitly, the popularity of that cliché reinforces, in the minds of many computer-coding libertarians, acceptance of the rationalization.

That fallacy relies on the false conflation of general “ideas” versus the actual very-specific and detailed presentations and designs that are subject to patent and copyright. I explain that here.

However, here I discuss the “great artists steal” cliché because it has harmful effects that go even beyond the attempts to rationalize the violation of intellectual property rights. There are three types of lies with which “Good artists copy, great artists steal” is associated when it is uttered. They are:
  1. Originality, in general, is overrated. It is less important than our culture makes it out to be. 
  2. No human creation is truly original anyway. 
  3. Specific parties that have contributed to innovation — which, by implication, means that they exercised originality — cannot be objectively identified. This premise presumes that every attempt to credit some party as a great originator and innovator is a false pretense. It is a false pretense, we are to believe, from the poisonous ideology of individualism. It is similar to the “Great Man Theory of History,” the conviction that history is driven by the pivotal choices of specific individuals rather than by the collective of everyone in general and nobody in particular. [The denial of the fact that, yes, history is largely driven by pivotal choices of specific individuals, should be a topic for another time.] Here, a favorite talking point of originality-deniers is that any time you believe you have identified the first party ever to have implemented a particular innovation, it will turn out later that someone else beat that other party to it. And if you switch to saying that this “someone else” was the first, it will turn out someone else did it still earlier. And on and on.
Contradicting each of those three points respectively, the realities are these.
  1. The phenomenon of human originality still does not receive enough due credit in any culture. Even cultures reputed to be more-individualistic, such as that of the United States, are still guilty of giving short shrift to the importance of human originality. The popularity of the cliché “Good artists copy, great artists steal,” in a region and industry once celebrated from innovativeness, itself exemplifies that. 
  2. History is full of examples of specific individuals being original. 
  3. Specific individuals who contributed to innovation — and therefore exercised originality — can be objectively identified. Indeed, there are many historical examples of this. Yes, there are many attempts to discredit the fact that specific originators have been identified properly. These attempts are similar to the red herring of “simultaneous invention.” Such attempts include the denial of the originality of the Wright brothers when it comes to their airplane. These discreditations, also, attempt to obscure the distinction between general “ideas” versus the specifics of presentation-and-design to which patents and copyrights apply.
The essay you are now reading, attempts to address all three of the above points at least to some degree. However, this essay will be mostly about Point Number 2. This essay will provide case studies of originality and progress in art. We focus on art because it is a discipline whose history is commonly and falsely cited as proof that originality is an illusion — that everything credited as “original” and innovative turns out not to be. 

Though this essay is a defense of artistic originality and — this should never have been necessary — an acknowledgment of artistic originality’s existence and importance, I must also spell out what this essay is not. I am not arguing that originality is the be-all end-all of art. I am not arguing that originality is the most important aspect of art. 

This is not to say that the identifiable first-ever usage of a style or device in an artwork is necessarily the best instance of it — that is usually not the case. There are works of art that are a historic “first” in terms of a particular style or device being used, and yet do not use that style or device as effectively as do much-later works.  There are also  instances where an artwork is a historic “first” and yet otherwise does not provide any especially moving emotional experience. By the same token, there are great artworks that, though showing a significant degree of originality, were made by artists who had “originality” relatively low on their list of priorities. As long as they do not partake in outright plagiarism, I do not want any artists to debilitate their own efforts out of worry over how derivative versus how original their works are in comparison to others’.

But what I am saying is that originality does exist, it is important, and our culture should cease in its demeaning of it in the form of such clichés as “Great artists steal” and “Nothing in art has ever truly been new.” The prevalence of those clichés indicate not that our culture has too much reverence for individualistic originality but too little respect for it.




Intellectuals Quoting Prominent People — Even Inventors — That Artistic Originality Is a “Myth”
You might be surprised what sort of prominent people have offered their own spins on the rationalization that downplays originality. It comes even from prominent people who, in contexts where more was at stake financially, jealously and rightfully defended their own IPRs. Alexander Graham Bell, for instance, is justly renowned for having invented the electric landline telephone, only to be smeared by Rothbardian libertarians who accuse him falsely of having covered-up the “simultaneous invention” of electric landline telephones with rival engineer Elisha Gray, scientist Philip Reis, and even fraudster Daniel Drawbaugh. Those accusations were soundly refuted in the biography by Robert V. Bruce, who had won the Pulitzer for another history of science. Despite that fact, and despite Bell having properly upheld his patents in court, there have been other contexts in which Bell himself fallaciously repeated the originality-deniers’ favorite talking points.

A very intellectual blog that has frequently expressed sympathy for the originality-deniers’ position approvingly quotes Bell on this topic. Given Bell’s experiences pertaining directly to questions of originality and of IPRs, Bell’s own originality-denialism must seem compelling. In a letter to Helen Keller’s teacher Annie Sullivan, Bell professes,
Our most original compositions are composed exclusively of expressions derived from others. . . . Our forms of expression are copied — verbatim et literatim — in our earlier years from the expressions of others which we have heard in childhood. It is difficult for us to trace the origin of our expressions because the language addressed to us in infancy has been given by word of mouth, and not permanently recorded in books so that investigators — being unable to examine printed records of the language addressed to us in childhood — are unable to charge us with plagiarism. We are all of us however, nevertheless unconscious plagiarists, especially in childhood. As we grow older and read books the language we absorb through the eye, unconsciously affects our style.
Someone else who should have defended the importance of originality was Mark Twain. Not only was he an author but also an inventor with several U.S. utility patents to his name. That same intellectual blog happily quotes Twain saying,
As if there was much of anything in any human utterance, oral or written, except plagiarism! The kernel, the soul — let us go further and say the substance, the bulk, the actual and valuable material of all human utterances — is plagiarism. For substantially all ideas are second-hand, consciously and unconsciously drawn from a million outside sources, and daily used by the garnerer with a pride and satisfaction born of the superstition that he originated them; whereas there is not a rag of originality about them anywhere except the little discoloration they get from his mental and moral caliber and his temperament, and which is revealed in characteristics of phrasing. When a great orator makes a great speech you are listening to ten centuries and ten thousand men — but we call it his speech, and really some exceedingly small portion of it is his. . . . It takes a thousand men to invent a telegraph, or a steam engine, or a phonograph, or a telephone or any other important thing — and the last man gets the credit and we forget the others. He added his little mite — that is all he did. These object lessons should teach us that ninety-nine parts of all things that proceed from the intellect are plagiarisms, pure and simple; and the lesson ought to make us modest. But nothing can do that [emphases Twain’s].
In the title of the intellectual blog post that quotes those words is even the phrase “The Myth of Originality.” And the same blog smugly quotes Tropic of Cancer author Henry Miller in declaring,
And your way, is it really your way? . . .

What, moreover, can you call your own? The house you live in, the food you swallow, the clothes you wear — you neither built the house nor raised the food nor made the clothes. . . .

The same goes for your ideas. You moved into them ready-made.
Note that Henry Miller’s argument is a variation on President Obama’s “You Didn’t Build That.” Houses, food, and clothing are produced through a market-based division of labor. That is not a social collective but the sum of many different individuals’ actions. In your job you produce economic value, what is more commonly known as “wealth.” And you trade that value to others for money. Once you have traded away, for money, the units of economic value you have produced directly, the quantity of economic value that you had produced is now stored in the money. In turn, when you exchange that money for a house, food, and clothes, it is the matter that the quantity of economic value you have indeed produced yourself is now retained in those possessions.

You have produced economic value on your own and then, through trade, converted that value into the house, food, and clothing that you retain. What Henry Miller elides is that, though you did not create the house, food, or clothes directly, you did create their value; you created the value that is now stored in everything willingly traded to you.

Similar to the originality-deniers’ argument, You-Didn’t-Build-That takes the fact that many people cooperated in helping an entrepreneur succeed and then tries to “spin” that in proclaiming that the entrepreneur’s success was due not to the entrepreneur’s choices primarily but instead to everyone in general and nobody in particular. And President Obama and Sen. Elizabeth Warren cite their false premise to proclaim that the entrepreneur is duty-bound to “give back” to that society of everyone-in-general-and-nobody-in-particular. And that “giving back” is to take the form of the entrepreneur putting on the pretense of consenting when President Obama and Sen. Warren exercise the power of the State to extract wealth and overrule the consensual contracts the entrepreneur has made with others. But as I have pointed out before, the entrepreneur already did pay everyone who helped her succeed, and she does have a record of the specific individuals who contributed to her success. That record is called the entrepreneur’s “payroll.”

Likewise, we do have a record of innovations that, until specific points in history, were completely unprecedented. Also likewise, when it comes to relatively recent innovations, there are times when we can ascertain reliably the identity of who originated what.

Henry Miller’s argument relies on a Stolen Concept. For over 90 percent of human history, there was no method to obtain food except hunter-gathering. There was no agriculture. For a particular region, someone had to be the first to have the idea to plant seeds and grow crops. Some ancient person was the first to have the idea of putting an animals’ pelt on one’s own body to keep warm. Some ancient person had to be the first to have the idea that instead of relying on a cave to protect from the elements, one could create a makeshift shelter in the wilderness, the first huts.

The fact that humans are capable of artistic originality, to me, is so obvious that it breaks my heart that I find it necessary to write an essay to explain this. To give you an idea of why I find it important, I will recount some conversations that show how trendy it is for intellectual people deny the fact of originality.




The Fact of Artistic Originality Denied By People Who Claim to Love a Book That Glorifies Originality
To show why I find this topic quite pressing, I want to tell of some of my experiences grappling with these ideas. A real eye-opener for me, when it comes to recognizing the significance of originality, was when I read The Fountainhead. This book is all about innovation. And the same goes for Atlas Shrugged. Whereas most of the other architects of the early twentieth century insist on making modern buildings resemble those of the past — Ralston Holcombe with his Renaissance style, and the builders of the Aquitania Hotel going with the Gothic style — Howard Roark takes a new path. Roark is not the first of the school of modern architecture, but he is one of its early practitioners. This new school of thought is consistent with a scientific appreciation for the world itself, applying the principle enunciated by the real-life modern-architecture pioneer Louis Henri Sullivan, “Form must follow function.” And as demonstrated by the novel’s climax, Roark will go to great lengths to protect the integrity of the very specific designs through which his original ideas find their implementation.

The emphasis in The Fountainhead on the importance of originality is corollary both to its explorations of human individualism and of technological progress.

Dictionary.Com says that to innovate is “to introduce something new; make changes in anything established.” To the extent that innovation and “progress” refer to unprecedented improvements in the procedures by which human beings carry their affairs, innovation and progress are predicated upon originality. Originality refers to initiation and initiative. As innovation and progress refer to a series of beneficent changes, that series would not commence if not for that first change, that first step, like a first ancient mutant fish stepping onto shore. The Totality of Existence did not need some supernatural entity, one external to all of Existence, to bring Existence itself into being. But everything of human affairs within Existence does need to be set in motion by a mover, a Prime Mover.  If the transmission of ideas is a river, the waterflow had some source . . . the fountainhead. 

In The Fountainhead, Howard Roark is not the first modern architect, but he appreciates the fact that he had beneficent forebearers, such as his mentor Henry Cameron, who did start modern architecture. Likewise, the real-life innovative designer Frank Lloyd Wright did recognize and appreciate the fact that modern architecture did have a first practitioner, possibly his mentor Louis Henri Sullivan.

Absent of the innovation’s origin — the manifestation of someone’s originality — there is no innovation and no technological progress. To say that there is innovation and technological progress but that there has never been originality — and, sadly, there are some intellectual people who say that — is to commit what Ayn Rand identifies as the Fallacy of the Stolen Concept (“stolen,” in this context, being the mark of a low-quality artist).

And just as beneficent progress presupposes originality, originality itself presupposes the psychological individualism that informs Howard Roark’s individualistic ethics. If someone in the arts or the design field merely copies the achievements of others, that copycat is relying on the judgment of those others more than her own. And the result will be that everything goes unimproved. Hence, the degree to which some party in arts and the design field is able to to devise some improvement in methodology is the degree to which that party had deviated from the strict emulation of others. That is, the extent to which that party devised an improvement in method is the extent to which that party had applied independence of thought to the matter. Most acts of psychological independence do not result in its practitioner gaining an insight that had been without precedent in all of human history. But in every instance where someone did piece together an insight unprecedented in human history, it was, by definition, formed — and identified as such — only through that person’s exercise of psychological independence.

Such psychological independence does not entail someone behaving strangely just for the sake behaving strangely and inviting others to gawk. If a man insisted on going out with his pants on backward, that would not be following convention, but it is doubtful that this would represent a great advancement in culture. Hence, The Fountainhead also satirizes the counterfeit individualism of pretentious hipsters. By contrast, as one thinks independently in drawing from the facts, there are moments when this independent thinker will notice and acknowledge something that other experts in the discipline either have not noticed or at least have not acknowledged sufficiently. In such cases, it is good for that thinker to bring attention to that which deserves more consideration. James Clerk Maxwell proposing the existence of airwaves is a fine case study in such psychological independence. And he had a similar contemporary in another science. In the 1800s when most educated men were still Young-Earth Creationists, Charles Darwin also showed important initiative.

As he himself publicly acknowledged in writing, Charles Darwin was nowhere near to being the first person to present evidence for the general phenomenon of biological evolution — not even the first in his own family.  As far back as ancient Greece, the philosophers Anaximander and Empedocles anticipated aspects of modern evolutionary theory, the former going as far as saying humans descended from a fish-like creature. During the Aristotle-influenced Islamic Golden Age, there were even Muslim philosophers who foresaw attributes of evolutionary theory. And much of the case that Darwin made had relied upon discoveries from other scientists, such as the geologist Charles Lyell.  Yet such people who theorized over biological evolution had still been fewer than a thousand in number, possibly even fewer than a hundred. 

Even considering the many forebearers, it was still through an act of psychological independence that Darwin accepted the facts. Both he and Alfred Russel Wallace made an advancement — an evolutionary leap in science itself — by explaining not merely the general idea of biological evolution but the specific mechanism by which it occurs: the process of natural selection.

Yes, other scientists preceded Darwin and Wallace in pointing out that all backboned land-dwellers descended from a fish. And, yes, other scientists such as Linnaeus preceded Darwin and Wallace in pointing out that human beings and the great apes descended from a common ancestor that was a hairy primate. But what was new and original from Darwin and Wallace was the following much-more-specific model. Within an environment, there is variation in physical features among different members of the same species. The species members with physical features unsuited to that environment die prior to being able to secure, for the long term, the future of their respective genealogical lines. By contrast, members of the species who have physical features that suit them to life in their environment are those that procreate successfully. In turn they transmit, to future generations, the very same physiological traits that had helped them thrive in that environment.

Among such variations in physiological traits, there can be some fishes in a swampy environment whose swim bladders help them breathe outside of water, and whose pectoral fins help them crawl around. And if such physical features help fishes thrive and procreate in that swampy environment to a degree greater than fishes of the same species who do not possess such traits, then, over generations, the land-crawling fishes will come to outnumber the ones who cannot crawl. That would especially be helpful if, as has happened in the Earth’s Devonian Period, microorganisms in the swampy water had made it so that the water taken in by the swamp’s fish inhabitants no longer provided them enough air, making it necessary for them to inhale air directly outside the water. And if this trend continues for a long-enough amount of time — millions of years — entire new clades of lifeforms may emerge, as did the first backboned four-legged land-dwellers in around 390 Million BCE. (Even they had their own historic “firsts!”) That was the specific process of natural selection, not articulated specifically even by the theorists of biological evolution who had preceded Darwin and Wallace.

And in the 1930s, scientists such as Ronald Fisher, unlike Darwin and Wallace, became aware of the discovery of dominant- and recessive genetics in Gregor Mendel’s experiments on pea plants. These scientists of the 1930s understood that genetics, as discovered by Mendel, accounted for the variation of which Darwin and Wallace had spoken. Hence this cadre of pioneers, led by Ronald Fisher, exercised their own originality and creativity in synthesizing the discoveries of Darwin-Wallace with Mendel.

And that someone other than Darwin had also pieced-together the fact of natural selection, does not, contrary to Malcolm Gladwell, discredit the fact of originality. 

Had Henry Miller been right that all ideas are — in his words — “ready-made,” then it would mean that Darwin and Wallace deserve no more credit for explaining natural selection than did all of their contemporaries who did not describe, or conceive of, natural selection. And it would mean that these two men do not deserve any more credit for discovering natural selection than did people, such as Bishop Wilberforce, who actively denied the reality of biological evolution. Moreover, Darwin demonstrated evolution’s reality to a degree that even Alfred Russel Wallace did not. Darwin’s intellectual journey is a real-life example of the sort of phenomenon that The Fountainhead dramatizes.

Though it has been said that Steve Jobs himself admired Ayn Rand’s writings, Roark himself has some choice words for those who snicker that good artists copy and great artists steal. In the script of the movie adaptation starring Gary Cooper, also written by Rand, Roark says,
Man cannot survive except through his mind. He comes on earth unarmed. His brain is his only weapon. But the mind is an attribute of the individual. There is no such thing as a collective brain. The man who thinks must think and act on his own. . . .The creator stands on his own judgment; the parasite follows the opinions of others. The creator thinks; the parasite copies.
Roark expresses the same idea in the original novel. But this time, his phrasing is more like T. S. Eliot’s than Steve Jobs’s:
We inherit the products of the thought of other men. We inherit the wheel. We make a cart. The cart becomes an automobile. The automobile becomes an airplane. But all through the process what we receive from others is only the end product of their thinking. The moving force is the creative faculty which takes this product as material, uses it and originates the next step. This creative faculty cannot be given or received, shared or borrowed. It belongs to single, individual men. That which it creates is the property of the creator. . . .

Nothing is given to man on earth. Everything he needs has to be produced. And here man faces his basic alternative: he can survive in only one of two ways — by the independent work of his own mind or as a parasite fed by the minds of others. The creator originates. The parasite borrows.
Note that Ayn Rand does not say that an innovation comes fully formed completely out of nowhere like Athena out of the head of Zeus. Roark says very plainly that, of course, innovators typically learned from the well-demonstrated developments of their forebears. What is of pertinence to this discussion, though, is that the innovator then takes the “next step.” And as the innovator pays well-earned gratitude toward those forebears, the new “step” taken by the innovator is to be attributed properly to, and rightfully owned by, that innovator herself. That “next step” does not belong to the forebears who inspired and taught the innovator as, by definition, those forebears did not take that “next step.” Nor can that “next step” — nor the fruits of it — be rightfully credited to everyone else in society who expressed no more than a mild interest in contributing directly to the innovator’s pursuit of that innovation. It was the innovative party that took that next step; all the other people did not. That is why the innovative design or presentation that the rational faculty “creates” is rightfully “the property of the creator.”

That the innovative process occurs in a nexus of both familiar and unfamiliar ideas is an observation that goes back at least as far as Aristotle in his treatise on plays and drama, Poetics. Poetics itself might be an innovative “first” — as I type this, scholars commonly regard it as the oldest-known work on literary criticism and literary analysis.

Aristotle’s explanation is as follows. For something to interest you, it has to have a fortuitous balance of elements that are familiar and those that are unfamiliar. If something is completely familiar to me, then there is nothing left for me to learn about it, and therefore I am too bored to bother with it. By the same token, if something is completely unfamiliar, then it seems not to have anything to do with me either, and therefore I need not bother with that.

But that dynamic shifts with the proper balance of familiarity with the strange. That there are aspects of something that are familiar means that it pertains to me and might address concerns I already have. Additionally, that there are aspects that are alien means that there is still more to learn. Put another way, I can take a new perspective on something I had previously thought I knew much about, and then examine it from this new angle. That there is some familiarity which is incomplete, is what draws my interest. In turn, that the alien aspects might shine additional light on what I had thought was familiar, sustains that interest. This can also be phrased as a balance of the known (familiar) with the unknown (alien).

That need to have a balance between the familiar and the strange extends to whether a new invention will be properly adopted by consumers and satisfy their marketplace demand. The twentieth-century industrial designer Raymond Loewy had his own manner of phrasing it. He deciphered that for the marketplace to adopt a new design, it should be “MAYA — Most Advanced [the unfamiliar side] Yet Acceptable [the familiar side].” From misinformation researcher Matthew Facciani on Threads, I learned that psychologist Todd Kashan also described this phenomenon. As Dr. Kashan explicates, “Curiosity peaks when our knowledge is neither too little [strange] nor too much [familiar], but just right...”

When it comes to originality, the familiar element is the material that is reconfigured to form something new. The earliest religions, such as in Bronze-Age Mesopotamia and even early Judaism, did not postulate that God created Existence from absolute nothingness. Rather, they posited that Existence always existed, and that, from these materials already existing, a creator deity such as Marduk refashioned the world into the form in which we currently know it. That is not creatio ex nihilo but creatio ex materia. This creatio ex materia is a term that also applies to human originality in art and technology.

This is what Austin Kleon mislabels a “re-mix” — with all the connotations downplaying the significance of the novel element — in his Steal Like an Artist. I hope that by this essay’s conclusion, the reader can see why even calling an innovation a very competent, beautiful “re-mix” is still to understate its significance and obscure the fact it induces a net gain in humanity’s creative value.

Inasmuch as the invention has features that are familiar, I can understand the invention’s purpose and can learn how I may use it to address concerns that were already plaguing me. Conversely, the aspects of the new invention that are unfamiliar and unprecedented create the possibility either
  1. that the invention can solve for me a problem that previously could not be solved; or
  2. that the invention can mitigate a problem of mine to a degree that is greater than was mitigated by prior attempts at solutions.
That can be seen with how in the late twentieth century, baby-boomers and Generation X — already familiar with landline telephones — then adopted the usage of mobile phones, a technology pioneered by engineers like Martin Cooper. The mobile phones had attributes in common with the landline phones with which baby-boomers and Generation X were already accustomed. Like landline phones, mobile phones had keypads of buttons labeled by Arabic numerals from 0 to 9. As with landline phones, users would push these buttons to input the numbers of parties they intended to call. And again as with landline phones, users would put their ears next to a part called a “receiver,” from which the user would hear speech from the speaker on the line’s other end, and speak into another part called a “transmitter.” This is very consistent with principles that Heinrich Hertz applied with his experiment in which an induction coil served as a primitive transmitter and a copper wire as a makeshift receiver.

However, landline telephones were connected by landlines running through houses and other buildings. To use the landline telephone, one would be confined to a particular location. The landline phone’s transmitter converted speech and other sounds into electrical signals sent through the landline. At the receiver end, the electrical signals are converted back into sounds. What was new about mobile phones was that they did not require the landlines. When someone spoke into the transmitter, the sound was converted into signals sent instead through the electromagnetic spectrum all around us, the airwaves. These are the same airwaves that James Clerk Maxwell was being wholly original in deducing, by logical necessity, to exist. This aspect — that, at the time, was novel and alien to telephony — was what enabled consumers to carry on their phone conversations absent of the previous limitations imposed by geography.

Note that acknowledgment of, and appreciation for, Martin Cooper’s innovation here does no injustice to the forebears on whose work he had built, such as Alexander Graham Bell. Contrary to Mark Twain’s presumption, to recognize that originality on Martin Cooper’s part has contributed to mobile phones emerging on the market when and how that they did — that this feat required some thoughts that were actually unprecedented — is not to minimize, snub, or “forget” predecessors from whom Martin Cooper had learned. Nay, it is simply to appreciate how the helpful aspects of this development came about because pioneers like Martin Cooper undertook intellectual integrations and actions that were new, novel, and indeed unprecedented.

Had there been nothing unprecedented in the works and thoughts of the engineers who pioneered in developing the first mobile phones, then mobile phones never would have found their way into households. All the electric telephones in existence would still only be landline ones. That would be the case if Henry Miller were right that the “ideas” of all people — including the engineers behind the earliest mobile phones — were “moved into... ready-made.” In 1955, the schematics needed to produce a practicable working mobile phone for consumers were not “ready-made.” And had these engineers’ thoughts been nothing but patchwork “re-mixes” of old ideas, providing no net gain in value beyond the sum of their parts — the patches — then that, too, would have resulted only in the failure to find any telephonic alternative to landlines.

The principle applies in every instance when the marketplace is hit with a new technology that dramatically changes much of human activity. And it applies even when the exact parties who originated that new technology cannot be identified with great confidence. There was a time when no humans had automobiles. Now we do have automobiles. At some point, for this to have happened, someone had to think some specific thoughts that no one in the past had ever conceived before. Someone had to have performed some specific actions that no in the past had ever undertaken before. Amid these developments, Carl Benz deserves acclaim for his three-wheeled motorized carriage, and Gottlieb Daimler has earned some fame for his four-wheeled creation as well.

In contrast to Mark Twain’s straw man, celebrating originality is not about giving short shift to the innovator’s predecessors, contemporaries, and competitors. Rather, celebrating originality is to acknowledge the fact that there are points in history where people are indeed capable of thinking thoughts and accomplishing feats that are unprecedented. These are thoughts and feats that are, in contrast to everything that human beings have already thought and done earlier, markedly distinguishable to an extent that is decisive.

With respect to how that which is interesting and innovative combines elements that are familiar and conventional with those that are novel, this is how Aristotle’s Poetics puts it,
The perfection of style [in poetry, drama, and theatre] is to be clear without being mean [ordinary, mundane]. The clearest style is that which uses only current or proper [normal] words; at the same time it is mean [has some plainness]… The diction, on the other hand, is lofty and raised above the commonplace which employs unusual words. By unusual, I mean strange (or rare) words, metaphorical, lengthened — anything, in short, that differs from the normal idiom. Yet a style wholly composed of such [unfamiliar] words is either a riddle or a jargon [meaning confusing]… A certain infusion, therefore, of these elements [both the familiar and the strange] is necessary to style; for the strange (or rare) word, the metaphorical, the ornamental, and the other kinds above mentioned, will raise it above the commonplace and mean [mundane], while the use of proper [ordinary, everyday] words will make it perspicuous [easy to understand]. But nothing contributes more to produce a cleanness of diction that is remote from commonness than the lengthening, contraction, and alteration of words. For by deviating in exceptional cases from the normal idiom, the language will gain distinction; while, at the same time, the partial conformity with [everyday] usage will give perspicuity [clearness]. The critics, therefore, are in error who censure these [novel] licenses of speech, and hold the author up to ridicule. 
That last line applies more broadly to our discussion. Those who cite the familiar and conventional elements of innovative designs and innovative presentations are lacking in perspective when they cite the conventionalities to downplay the importance of the aspects that are novel and unprecedented.

For these reasons, the point of Howard Roark’s that I quoted earlier is quite straightforward. But, to many people, it isn’t — even among some who have gushed about how much Ayn Rand and The Fountainhead have inspired them.

I will tell you of two exchanges I had.

Years ago, tired of rationalizations for originality-denial, such as those from Rothbardians and that intellectual blog to which I linked above, I took to Twitter. I tweeted,
“Good artists copy, great artists steal.”
—Insipid cliché

“Great artists originate.”
—Me
I anticipated that I might get a response from a churlish apologist of originality-denial. And I did. But it was not in the exact form I expected. It came from someone older than I am, Andrew of Generation X. We had not met face-to-face, but we did become a bit acquainted online. Around the middle of the twenty-first century’s first decade, Andrew had started one of the earliest blogs about Ayn Rand’s Objectivist philosophy. He had read Ayn Rand’s books, such as The Fountainhead, and expressed that they inspired and informed him. Surely, I had thought, someone who publicly expressed such devotion to The Fountainhead and Ayn Rand’s ideas would understand the importance of originality, especially with how it relates to individualism, psychological independence, and progress.

Well, as it turned out, no.

Presuming that I had never encountered it before — as opposed to the thousands of times that I had — Andrew proceeded with the usual straw-man argument, delivering the usual misrepresentation of what a defender of originality says. Andrew proceeded to recite how it is true how great artists steal, because no work of greatness emerges ex nihilo — the Latin expression what his exact words. Instead, as he recited in his whacking of the straw man, even in works of Shakespeare that are celebrated as original there is use of established conventions, or at least tropes that were new in Shakespeare’s time but which Shakespeare himself did not invent. What made Andrew’s mansplaining worse was that I had my real-time notifications on.

Exactly as Andrew was lecturing me condescendingly, Twitter had notifications appear on the screen showing the whole tweet. It began “1/3,” indicating that this was merely the start of a series. Not only was Andrew reciting the usual straw man at me, but it would not stop at one tweet; it would be a whole series.

Sick of this, I very bluntly tweeted at Andrew that I wanted him to spare me the straw man; no defender of originality says — or even implies — that any artwork or invention appreciated as novel just emerged ex nihilo, absent of some more-conventional features pertaining to the preexisting context that innovation was made to address. Nor does acknowledging the existence and importance of originality hinge upon the notion that works of originality emerge ex nihilo free of influence from any more-conventional predecessor.

Rather than ex nihilo, the defenders of originality point out that originality arises ex materia — out of already-existing material — and that, from a novel arrangement of the existing material, arises a net increase in economic value that is beyond any mere “re-mix,” that new net increase in value being an Emergent Property.

To that, Andrew expressed his annoyance and tweeted “Jesus Christ. Calm down.”

I tweeted, less sharply than before, that I wouldn’t.

Andrew then tweeted some onomatopoeia conveying that his face fell flat on a desk in vicarious embarrassment for me, and said that he doesn’t have time for close-minded and “judgmental” people like me.

I expected some defensiveness on Andrew’s part, as that is common for Twitter and Facebook. But I did not anticipate, or initially recognize, the serious degree to which I had angered him.

Thinking this over for some minutes, I tweeted to Andrew that I apologize about my choice of words in my immediate reaction but that I maintain that, due to its harmfulness in how it misleads people, expressions of approval for the “great artists steal” cliché should always be reproached.

I did not receive a reply. And some years later, I learned why.

To the extent that the originality-deniers acknowledge that arousal and innovation come from stimuli that combine both familiar and unfamiliar elements, the originality-deniers place emphasis only on the part that is familiar. To the degree that the originality-deniers acknowledge that there is novelty to something, they seek to minimize it as nothing more and nothing better than an Emergent Property to have arisen from what is truly notable: the familiar elements. The most original aspects for them are, at best, a “re-mix” and “good theft” rather than “bad theft.” But to value originality is not to place, as they do, the bulk of the credit on the familiar elements. To value originality is to place attention on, and thus develop appreciation for, the Emergent originality itself.

According to Andrew, Shakespeare could not have created something beautiful and new had Shakespeare not also used literary devices that were not his own invention. Hence, the originality-denier concludes, it is true that “great artists steal.” But we should consider how the word steal is used here. Even as we recognize that this does not refer to a literal theft that should be punished by law, the “steal” is not flattering to Shakespeare or anyone else. By definition, it implies that Shakespeare does not have complete rightful “ownership” over what has previously been credited as his innovativeness. Praising something backhandedly by calling it “good theft” — an asinine oxymoron — does not cut it.

By contrast, to recognize originality is to face the allegedly-“just cheeky” labels of “stealing” and “good theft” as the belittlement that they are. It is from Shakespeare’s clever combination of familiar elements in a new context that Emerges a form of aesthetic experience that is indeed novel — full stop. No part of the emergent novelty need be diminished by any accusation of “stealing” — not even a mischievous use of that term. Instead, from the novelty of it, Shakespeare earns full “ownership.” Period. To acknowledge and appreciate the existence, occurrence, and importance of creative originality logically requires no more justification than that.

There is an epilogue to the story of Andrew. On Facebook I had been communicating with many people who claimed to have been inspired by Ayn Rand and Objectivism, but I was perturbed by some very creepy cliques that had formed among them. One clique agreed with the white nationalist ravings about a Great Replacement, somehow trying to cite Ayn Rand as if she would have approved of all of that. The other clique was of Robert F. Kennedy, Jr.-types who preached against vaccines, GMOs, and any other well-corroborated scientific findings that contradicted their favorite fetishistic beliefs. Because life is too short for all of their melodrama, I Facebook-blocked a lot of members of these two cliques.

Much after my Twitter exchange with Andrew, I had been shown very disturbing screen shots. Members of both the white-supremacist clique and health-fad clique had come together and formed a whole club dedicated to airing grievances against me for Facebook-blocking them. I was shown one Facebook thread in particular. In retrospect, it might sound unsurprising that white nationalists and RFK Jr.-types would be getting together, as both groups are prominent in MAGA. But this alliance occurred before the discovery of COVID-19 and before vaccine-denialism became a prominent part of the MAGA movement. Amid the grievances against me from the RFK Jr.-types and the white nationalists, in that thread I saw one familiar name in particular. It was Andrew. Andrew said he was relieved that other Objectivists have learned the unflattering truth about Stuart. He mentioned having learned first-hand that Stuart is an “ass” — his exact word — and, upon learning that, he blocked me immediately on Twitter.

That is why he never saw my apology to him. And this is the guy participating in this hate-fest about how I am the one who is too quick to write other people off. Upon seeing that, I can tell you that far from being made to feel remorse over having Facebook-blocked these cliques, I was reminded of why I had Facebook-blocked them in the first place. And I had much less reason to feel sad about Andrew having blocked me over Twitter.

I don’t know if Andrew is still interested in Ayn Rand’s writings. But I do know that this guy knew how to hold a grudge. That exchange over Twitter haunted me as well — it continues to do so — but for reasons different from Andrew’s. I had been blissfully under the impression that someone enthused and gushing over Ayn Rand and The Fountainhead would have enough appreciation of originality’s importance to understand how degrading it is when people smugly repeat “Good artists copy, great artists steal.”

That even people who proclaim love for Howard Roark have such little respect for his defense of originality, was, for me, a rude awakening.

But Andrew would say I’m just rude.

And that was not a fluke. Not long after — though it did not result in as much long-term animus — I had yet another, similar encounter.

There was a raspy-voiced European whom I had met face-to-face in Hawaii and with whom I continued to communicate over Facebook. He, too, said he was inspired by Ayn Rand and was all about free-enterprise philosophy. But, creepily, this European wanted me to be open-minded toward Murray Rothbard and his anarcho-“capitalism.” Being swept under the rug was acknowledgment of Rothbard’s long record of sleazy behavior.

The European had known from my previous Facebook posts that I valued the principle of originality. He had already seen how greatly I worried about this trend, existing even among self-proclaimed free-market advocates, of denying the existence of, and necessity for, originality. One day, not directly solicited by me or anyone else, he posted a YouTube video on my Facebook wall. The video was a documentary about how many artworks praised as innovative actually rely on the revival of older traditional methods. The documentary’s creators did not mean that the incorporations of these traditions diminished the new artwork’s importance but instead strengthened it. But the European was, like the intellectual blog that quoted Mark Twain, more interested in scoring points for the originality-denial side.

He told me that this showed that “Nothing is truly new.”

I got snippy and replied, “That’s right. Automobiles weren’t new in Germany in the late 1800s. People have always had them, even in the caveman days.”

The European didn’t seethe to the extent that Andrew did, but he still was not amused. In his reply he just restated that every artwork that is praised as innovative actually incorporates traditional conventions and therefore he is correct that nothing is truly new.

The European is invoking the same logical fallacy as Mark Twain in the passage that the intellectual blog quoted. I learned about the logical fallacy’s formal name from Raymond C. Niles, and it is called the Composition Fallacy. A Composition Fallacy occurs when someone notices a characteristic of a particular part of X and then presumes that the characteristic applies to X overall. For example, an automobile has parts made out of plastic. It would be a Composition Fallacy to conclude from this that the entire car is made of plastic. Likewise, every normal functioning human eye still has blind spots. It would be a Composition Fallacy if someone concludes that this means that no human eye is capable of sight. And a similar fallacy is employed in the citation of original works’ conventional aspects to deny originality per se.

The assumptions of Mark Twain and the European not being valid, the presence of conventional aspects in an artwork or invention do not negate the aspects that are novel.

Now one might ask if I am engaging in the same Composition Fallacy as that European but in reverse. If an artwork has parts both conventional and unconventional, and it would be a fallacy to say that only one of those elements characterizes the entire artwork, then who am I to conclude the reverse of the European: that this artwork is not all-old-and-conventional but instead all-original? But I am not saying that the artwork is all-original. What I am saying is that the original aspects are important, and that this novelty added by the creator deserves to be recognized accordingly. Moreover, even if only a small fraction of an artwork is original, that already disproves 100 percent the clichés that “Nothing in art is truly new” and that originality is but a “myth.” And it demonstrates, in spite of Steve Jobs’s misquotation, that an artist has alternatives other than “copying” and “stealing.” There is a possibility of creating something that transcends all of its inspirations, as opposed to there being only this false dichotomy of “good theft” versus “bad theft.” James Clerk Maxwell’s proposition of the existence of airwaves, for instance, was built upon many other valid and excellent discoveries. And yet this proposition itself was so transcendent as to be something new in and of itself.

And there is a related argument, which we shall touch upon later in this essay. It goes like this:
Everything in art is a copy of other art. The movie Pretty Woman copied the musical My Fair Lady, based on a George Bernard Shaw’s play Pygmalion, which itself was copied from the Greek myth of the same name. Therefore, no work of fiction has ever been one of originality.
This is similar to how Rothbardian IP-haters blur the distinction between general ideas for a category of product versus their very specific implementation. When I said that Jack Northrop was right to patent his “flying-wing” structure for airplanes, it has been common for Rothbardian libertarians to spew, “Who is Jack Northrop to gain a monopoly on the market for airplanes?” Jack Northrop patenting his “flying-wing” structure did not grant him a monopoly on the manufacture of airplanes; it granted him a “monopoly” on the very specific blueprints, schematics, and delineation for a sort of airplanes dissimilar from other airplanes.

Likewise, it is not a copy when one work of fiction is inspired by the general premise of another. Originality is found in the specifics. There are many specifics in the movie Pretty Woman that make it distinct from My Fair Lady and the Pygmalion myth. Just as an artwork using some conventions does not deny all its originality, the same goes for it sharing an older work’s entire general premise. The new artwork being distinct on specifics is sufficient for it to be recognized as original. And, even as it shares similarities with older works, the degree to which the new work deviates from the old tropes and old premise is the degree to which it gains potential for a groundbreaking originality. One does not have to give any backhanded compliments about something being a competent “re-mix”; one can simply appreciate that there are aspects that are original.

Over the years I have reflected upon the aforementioned exchanges with self-proclaimed admirers of the ideas of Ayn Rand, exchanges that bewildered and saddened me. That so many people who claim to revere The Fountainhead have recited to me the straw-man attack on originality has taught me the grimmest of lessons. It is that people claiming to revere a book that extols the virtues of originality does not translate necessarily to them valuing those virtues. Such people conveniently gloss over how the book itself had anticipated and rebutted the very straw-man argument they confidently recite. Again, The Fountainhead points out that works of originality do rely on some conventions, and that, more importantly, the presence of those conventions does not invalidate the aspects that are original. Again, Roark notes that the conventions that the innovator learns “from others is only the end product of their thinking” whereas the “moving force is the creative faculty which takes this product as material, uses it and originates the next step.” It is that “next step” that is the originality and which belongs to the innovator, not the predecessors from whom the innovator has learned. 

 The originality-deniers are also answered in Atlas Shrugged. In inventing his new alloy, Rearden Metal, Hank Rearden relied upon the inventions of those who had preceded him in time, such as blast furnaces. On account of that, churlish James Taggart tells a young woman named Cherryl Brooks,
He didn’t invent iron ore and blast furnaces, did he? . . . Rearden. He didn’t invent smelting and chemistry and air compression. He couldn’t have invented his Metal but for thousands of other people. [Sounds like Mark Twain.] His Metal! Why does he think it’s his? Why does he think it’s his invention? Everybody uses the work of everybody else. Nobody ever invents anything [emphasis in book].
To that, Cherryl tells him, “But the iron ore and all those other things were there all the time. Why didn’t anybody else make the Metal, but Mr. Rearden did?”

That these originality-deniers are refuted by what they have proclaimed to be a favorite book of theirs makes it seem as though they and I have not read the same book. When Andrew read that exchange between James Taggart and Cherryl, apparently he didn’t get as much out of it as he should have.

Atlas Shrugged is itself highly original in its premise. The premise is distinct from alleged literary precursors, Garet Garrett’s The Driver and Ernest Bramah’s The Secret of the League. It was, and is, common for people to say that entrepreneurs are just parasites on their employees — that if their personnel walked out on them, the entrepreneurs would be helpless. Unlike The Driver and League and any other books, Atlas Shrugged dramatizes what would happen if it was the innovative entrepreneur who walked out, going on strike against an ungrateful society.

Besides it being another repetition of the clichés to deny originality, the exchange with the European lingered with me for another reason. The European was very obviously wrong about how there was never anything “new” in the history of art — even ten seconds of thought should have shown him the illogic of that conclusion. Of course there had to be “firsts” within that chronology — even if the exact instance of a “first” could not be identified — otherwise there would never be any visual forms of artistic media other than cave paintings and rock sculptures.

Still, there was an aspect to this where I found myself feeling inadequate in how informed I was. Prior to this exchange, I had not given much thought to the “firsts” in the history of the development of different artistic media. Had the European asked me for examples of “firsts” in the history of art, I would not have been able to cite, with confidence, many case studies.

That brings me to a matter that especially motivated me to write this essay. In the years since that exchange, I have looked into the history of innovation in artistic media. Even when historians cannot identify with confidence the exact party to have originated a particular artistic style or method, the very fact that the artistic style or method now exists — when there was a time when it had not — necessarily presupposes that some party had to be the first to practice it. Again, there can be no trend of change, advancement, or innovation without that trend having been initiated. And in that initiation is the originality.

Still, historians have often found strong evidence by which they can state with confidence that some specific person is the earliest-known — known among these scholars — to have made use of a particular method or style. Hence, I want the rest of this essay to be a litany of examples of innovation in artistic media. When it comes to more-recent developments — that is, from the twentieth century onward — I can even name particular persons as the ones who plausibly may have been the first to have tried a specific style or method.

It is true that sometimes historians name one pioneer, Mr. Y, as likely the first person to have dabbled in a style or method, only later to learn that he had been chronologically preceded by Mr. X, even if Mr. X’s attempts were cruder or less practicable in comparison. As I mentioned earlier, originality-deniers are fond of citing such instances as proof not only that the style’s or method’s “first” practitioner can never be identified, but that this inability to identify such a person also proves that there cannot be one true originator — and, by extension, there should be no intellectual property rights. I often spoke, face-to-face, with a Rothbardian economics professor who would make that sort of manipulative point in debate.

Notwithstanding the logical fallacies of the originality-deniers, the psychological phenomenon of artistic originality is not delegitimized by it turning out that Mr. Y had been preceded in some form by Mr. X. Rather, enthusiasts of art history can still appreciate and credit Mr. Y for being a pioneer, a relatively early practitioner of the style or discipline, and they can also acknowledge Mr. X as having been a predecessor, even if Mr. X’s versions were simpler than Mr. Y’s. And that logic still applies if it turns out Mr. X was preceded by Mr. W, who in turn was anticipated by Mr. V, and on and on. The fact that there had been “firsts” remains; the fact of originality remains. And, not to be fooled by the enemies of patent rights, the fact that our modern versions of products did not emerge in the complete form by which we know them today, but instead took that form through gradual increments by separate inventors over decades, does not alter that fact either. Gainsaying the assumptions of the originality-deniers, the matter does not have to be any more complicated than that.

With that in mind, in my history of innovation in art, I will be giving some examples of possible “firsts.” I can name, for example, the earliest known-by-historians example of an American-made fiction-narrative jungle-safari movie.




“All of These ‘Firsts’ in Art Relate to Changes in Technology, But Not to Basic Ideas Like ‘Love’ and ‘Heartbreak,’ So There’s No Originality After All”
But before providing my litany of case studies, I should make special mention of how many of the innovations in style and method are largely the result of advancements in technology. One might say, “Even if the technologies through which art is presented do change, the fundamental ideas conveyed in art, such as love and grief, have been constants since the Stone Age. Therefore, when it comes to the fundamentals, the most basic themes in art have remain unchanged. Hence, there really is nothing of importance in art that is new or original.”

But such an objection is shortsighted. Note that this argument is largely a restatement of the one insisting that if newer works of fiction share the same general premise of older works — ignoring the many differences in specifics — then it means there has never been originality in any works of fiction. Marshall McLuhan disabuses us of such a misconception by pointing out, “The medium is the message.” That is, the type of artistic medium — say, dance versus painting —influences the specific manner in which the ideas are conveyed. And the very manner in which the ideas are conveyed, influences the overall experiences and thereby the manner in which the ideas are processed. This allows for greater diversity and sophistication in which ideas are transmitted.

Furthermore, as societies grow accustomed to changes in technology, it allows for the telling of stories with plots that previously would have hardly been comprehensible to their intended audiences. Consider the motion picture You’ve Got Mail. This is the story of two rival brick-and-mortar bookstore owners, each of a different sex. On account of their business rivalry, they hate each other. Yet in the privacy of their own homes they log onto the World Wide Web and e-mail one another anonymously, using usernames. And each of these people fall in love with the other’s online persona.

That movie is based on earlier works. They are a play, talkie movie, and musical movie — respectively, Parfumerie (1937); The Shop Around the Corner (1940); and Good Old Summertime (1949). As these productions took place prior to there being a World Wide Web, naturally they are about a different technology. In these versions, the two romantic leads are co-workers who dislike one another in their everyday face-to-face encounters. However, again privately in each of their respective separate homes, they correspond by snail mail. In writing their love letters, they do not use their real names.

Even though the communication/information technology that is used as a plot device is different, You’ve Got Mail and Parfumerie have the same general premise. That may initially seem to be evidence that technological leaps cannot change the basics of the plots of fiction. But consider the Stone Age when all human societies were hunter-gatherer clans.

It was not only that there was no postal service, but there was a point in history, prior to agriculture replacing hunter-gathering as the main source of food, when people did not live in huts separate from one another. At this point, there was little distinction between “family” and “society”; the entire clan was a family unit in that most of its members were related genetically, not far removed from one another. (Although people did not know consciously about genetic diversity, genetic diversity was maintained when different clans came into contact and swapped spouses.) Except for shamans conducting their rituals in caves surrounded by cave paintings that seemed to be animated by firelight, most people had much less privacy then than they did upon the emergence of city life. And this was prior to written language.

It was not as though someone could produce an anonymously-authored document expressing one’s love for someone else and then, within the confines of privacy, have that document delivered to that object of amorous intent. These ancient hunter-gatherers already were telling stories around a fire at night — often the shaman was the storyteller — and some of these were love stories. But for ancient hunter-gatherers who had only encountered other hunter-gatherers, a love story such as You’ve Got Mail would be incoherent. The plot is understandable to us — even if we do not find the movie entertaining — not only because of changes in technology, but also as a result of the extent to which our society has grown accustomed to those changes.

For such reasons, it is legitimate to say that when artists use new technologies to express themselves, the new technologies allow for new ideas to be explored. They also allow for old general-ideas to be examined from new angles, resulting in new specific-ideas. Accordingly, new styles and artistic methods resulting from technological changes do influence both the presentation of ideas and the ideas presented. In short, when changes in artistic styles and methods were mostly the result of progress in technology, the objection that they do not count as innovations in art-as-such does not pass muster. Insofar as an innovation in artistic style or method resulted mostly from advancements in technology, that is still an innovation-in-the-arts per se.

Moreover, even when the ideas are old, there are “firsts” in terms of how the old ideas are presented in new artistic media. As I type this, the earliest-known written use of first-person pronouns is in a work of art. It is a poem and chant from Enheduanna, an ancient Mesopotamian princess and high priestess. She speaks both for herself and other citizens of their Akkadian city-state in praying to a goddess.

The early history of written and performed artworks in the Bronze Age was tied to civics: these artworks were overseen directly by the leader of the society and were promoted as advancing the society as a whole. That was a norm even for pre-agricultural clans. Often dances and story-tellings were performed by people publicly — not that privacy, again, was much of an option back then — in a manner intended to promote the interests of the community. Examples would be rituals said to have honored the gods and spirits so that they would shower good fortune upon the community.

The ancient Greek lesbian poetess Sappho exemplified something that, in comparison to most of the human history that preceded her, was quite new. She and other Greek poets began to write, on parchment, poems expressing their own personal feelings. No longer was verse confined only to public rituals of civic importance; it could also be for one’s private personal reflections and satisfaction. Moreover, Sappho deployed a sort of stanza that archaeologists have not found to be employed by her known predecessors in poetry. It consists of three long lines and then a short line. Because this is unseen in known forebearers, this is called a “Sapphic stanza.”

Yes, people had already felt love and physical attraction for millennia prior to Sappho. But being able to write on paper — a then-relatively-new technology — within the privacy of a walled-up enclosure definitely helped Sappho express those ancient emotions in a manner that was new. Even if future archaeologists discover that she was not the first poetess to do this, she was one among a relatively small number of participants in an innovative trend. Love and romantic attraction were not new, but the manner in which this new artistic movement had explored and articulated these feelings was indeed new and original.

Mindful of that consideration, let us get on with the survey. I hope such a survey, though far from exhaustive, will expose to readers the absurdity of insisting that there is no originality, that nothing in the history of art has ever truly been new.

And so it begins.




Theories on How Cave Paintings and Cave Sculptures Were Invented
I have said that if it were true that there was no innovation in the arts, then there would be no form of visual media other than cave paintings and rock sculptures. But I must acknowledge that cave paintings and rock sculptures themselves were innovations. There was once a day in antiquity when there were hominins but no cave paintings or rock sculptures. And then at some point, cave paintings and rock sculptures did exist. Someone had to invent them.

Social scientists such as Izzy Wisher have a theory on how this may have happened. Psychologists recognize a phenomenon called pareidolia. It is when you look at one sort of object, and patterns of shade or color or shape in it remind you of an entirely different sort of object. It is pareidolia, for instance, when you look at a cloud and say that its shape resembles that of your cat.

The theory is that pareidolia played a role in inspiring the first figurines and first cave paintings. According to the theory, some ancient person saw a formation of rock in a cave and thought it already resembled a person or animal, such as a bull. However, it occurred to this person that the formation could be reshaped further. Hence, the person carved and reshaped the rock formation to become an even stronger likeness of the person or animal. These would become the first statues and figurines.

Something similar happened with cave paintings. Some ancient humans noticed that different types of rock come in different colors. They noticed that images could be made on the wall of a cave by smearing, onto the wall, wet clay or sticky dust particles from a different sort of mineral. At some point, they saw markings already existing on the cave wall and, again, pareidolia took effect. Of the markings already present, some already looked like people or animals. Once again, they smeared other types of mud and dust onto the markings to alter them, making them into more well-defined representations.

Archaeologists and anthropologists have various theories about these cave paintings. One is that they were made for private rituals carried out by shamans — also what would be called “witch doctors” or “medicine men.” The shaman may have believed that an image of a particular sacred animal had captured its supernatural power. As I said in the discussion of You’ve Got Mail, the shaman may have prayed to the cave painting. Some theorists argue that cave paintings reached a point of sophistication such that, when the shaman lit the cave’s interior with a small fire, the cave wall’s images were painted in such a manner that the dancing of the firelight upon the cave images had created the illusion that the cave painting’s objects — the people and animals — were themselves moving with the firelight.

Even in the case of the first cave paintings, the innovation has identifiable traits that are well-established and those that are novel. The already-familiar traits are the already-existing markings and rock formations that, through pareidolia, immediately called to mind some humans or particular animals. The novelty was in the choice of humans to take the initiative in altering the markings and rock formations further to attain the results they wanted.

Ancient figurines and statues of women have shapes that, today, we would not associate usually with feminine nudes. The ancient statues of women have very decidedly pear-shaped torsos. And they are not life-sized. From this, we can segue into a discussion of innovation in sculpture in Hellenic and Hellenistic culture.




Dianne Durante’s History of Innovation in Western Sculpture
A good survey of innovations in sculpture in ancient Greece is that of art historian Dianne L. Durante in her book Innovators in Sculpture and Medium series Art History Through Innovators: Sculpture. She lets us know from the start that only a tiny percentage of ancient Greek sculptures that have existed have survived to this day and have been recovered. For that reason, it is difficult to identify with confidence who were the earliest artists to have used a particular method. Still, the general century and sometimes even the general decade in which a new method has been spotted to appear — and some specific sculptors associated with that method — can still be named.


Ms. Durante starts with the Bronze Age. This was not something Durante mentioned in particular, but this was a time when Mesopotamians erected statues of deities with the heads of men and the bodies of winged animals. Ms. Durante begins with a culture which had important contact with these Mesopotamians, that of Bronze-Age Egypt. Starting from around 3000 BCE, one can find the earliest examples of a particular innovation. The Egyptians produced their first realistic life-sized statues of men. The hair looked very stiff, as if the hair was a hat instead. The arms were always to the sides and there was no space of separation between them and the torso. The left foot was usually farther forward than the right, and the legs were usually unseparated from a larger slab that kept the figure standing.

I will say something that is not a point in Ms. Durante’s history. That the ancient Egyptians provided this and other Bronze Age innovations — such as Egyptians inventing geometry for commercial reasons — is unsurprising in consideration of how Egypt and Babylon were freer than most other human societies of their time. Archaeologists have found that the pyramids were built not by Hebrew slaves but by free Egyptians. Many of those laborers had farmed for most of the year and sought employment in constructing the pyramids in the seasons when the Nile flooded and made farming impossible. Egyptians sought this employment voluntarily and they were well-paid. The items that accompanied their burials indicate that Egyptian rulers thought well of these people and that they were high-status.

Egypt’s relative freedom also possibly led to the development of the alphabet. Canaanites voluntarily migrated to Egypt for work. Even when the pay was low compared to that of the native-born citizens, it paid more than the sort of work in the place of origin left behind. These Canaanite immigrants were, in that regard, similar to many of today’s migrant workers to the USA and other Western countries. These Canaanites found work in Egypt’s turquoise mines. They were able to observe the religious rites of the wealthy Egyptians who employed them. These Egyptians included the use of hieroglyphs in their ceremonies as Canaanite employees gaped in awe.

Aspiring to be like their employers, at first the Canaanite miners tried to emulate these rituals. When it comes to innovation, the visual similarity to hieroglyphs can be called the familiar part. But these Canaanites had a limitation the wealthy Egyptians did not — they were still illiterate. Hence, according to Egyptologist Orly Goldwasser, these Canaanites produced pictograms visually similar to the Egyptians’ but without the same meaning.

Over time, though, each pictogram came to be associated not with an entire word but just a specific sound. That was the part that was novel. Unable to understand the written language of others, these Canaanites developed their own from the bottom-up. These former illiterates had taught themselves to read through a most unexpected method — inventing their own form of writing. For almost all of the consonants known today, each was represented by a visual symbol that was a modified and simplified version of an Egyptian pictograph.

The Bronze Age economic collapse led to a decline in the business activity that made use of cuneiform writing. As the Canaanites brought about economic recovery in their own trading, their heavy use of their own alphabetic writing had supplanted the cuneiform format that had previously dominated Eurasia. Those Canaanites’ descendants, the Phoenicians, undertook a prodigious amount of trading, including with the Greeks. From the Phoenicians' documents of their trades with the Greeks, Greek merchants learned the alphabet. But the Canaanite/Phoenician alphabet consisted only of consonants. It was the Greeks who added the vowels we use today.

Returning to Ms. Durante’s history, she mentions that there was not much change in the Egyptian sculptors’ conventions until 300 BCE. Durante makes it a point to mention how this means there was relatively little change in 2,700 years. And just as was the case with the use of the alphabet, in realistic life-sized statues of men we find another instance of something that began in Egypt and which was developed further by the ancient Greeks.

Even when the new ideas did not arrive via Phoenician middlemen, Egyptians initially influenced the ancient Greeks in the Bronze Age and then into the Iron Age. But for the Iron-Age Greeks, innovation in sculpture occurred at a much more rapid pace. In particular, Durante focuses on the evolution of the Greek kouros — idealized statues of young male nudes. They appeared around 600 BCE, and at first they closely resembled the Egyptian statues. The torsos and hair styling were similar, and once again the left foot was farther forward than the right. But besides the kouros being nude instead of in a man’s skirt, there were some other important differences. Though the arms were still at the sides, the elbows and forearms had space between them and the torso. The figure stood without a large backboard, and the musculature was more defined.

By 450 BCE — 150 years later — Greek sculpture had already seen dramatic advancement. By this point, the Iron Age, sculptors were making use of a scientific principle that modern Italian practitioners call contrapposto. This refers to how, as someone stands, the weight being placed upon one part of the body causes the shoulders and hips to shift their position accordingly to maintain balance. Many of the statues from the fifth century BCE applying that principle are attributed to the sculptor Polycleitus.

In the earlier part of the fifth century BCE, there was another technological innovation. Sculptors did not always have to rely on stone. They had learned the technique of Middle-Easterners in casting life-sized figures in bronze. The advantage was that bronze was easier to shape. From the 440s to 430s BCE, Pheidas carved statues where there was much detail. When the statues depicted clothed figures, he made realistic pleats in their clothing. The facial expressions of these statues, though, were always neutral.

In the 300s BCE, there was another new trend, this one exemplified by Praxiteles and Lysippus. Prior to the works of these two men, ancient Greek statues were carved with the intention of having been seen mostly from the front. Even when the sculptors first exercised the principle of contrapposto, the statues were posed in such a manner that all of the important details of the action in the pose could be taken in from the front view. By contrast, Praxiteles and Lysippus caved important details in the statue from every angle. An onlooker would have to walk in a circle around the piece to observe every pertinent feature. Lysippus’s details were so precise, as well, that he could carve what historians and archaeologists suspect were very accurate likenesses of real people. The most famous bust of Aristotle is attributed to him. One may note the precision of detail in the subtle wrinkles in Aristotle’s face and in the minute separation of hairs in his beard.

Around the 350s BCE, Scopas added something new: nuanced facial expression. In contrast to Pheidas’s statues always having neutral faces, Scopas used the subtle shapes of the eyelids and curves of the lips to convey a variety of emotions, such as trepidation and sorrow.

By the 200s BCE in the Roman Republic, there was greater variety in the sort of figures presented. No longer was the medium confined to images of idealized men. Sculptors produced representations of elderly women and of small children. They also tried to produce accurate representations of the clothes of foreigners with whom Greek and Roman merchants came in contact.

It has become fashionable for intellectuals to proclaim that it is a myth that there was a “Dark Age” in Western Europe in the duration separating the fall of the Western Roman Empire versus the early years of the Renaissance. Nonetheless, there is a noticeable economic decline in this location and duration. That definitely applies when assessing the degree of sophistication in Western European sculpture throughout the ages. The archaeological record evinces that it was not until around the 1400s CE with artists like Donatello that the old Greek and Roman methods were recovered.

Ms. Durante goes on further in her survey to note of the Renaissance bringing about a new attitude and appreciation for sculptors that was less apparent in Western Europe’s early Middle Ages. But here I will conclude my own essay’s heavy reliance on Ms. Durante’s history. There are more-recent case studies in innovation in artistic method.




Firsts in the History of Motion Pictures
The term lost media refers to artworks and other information-technology documents that are considered “lost” to posterity because there are currently no units of them known to remain. The fact that, as Ms. Durante has noted, the vast majority of ancient Greek and Roman statues ever to have existed no longer do is a fact that puts them in the category of “lost media.” Likewise, most of the earliest documented-to-have-existed motion-picture prints shown in theaters have been lost, destroyed over time by the elements. However, thanks to many journalistic accounts still available, it is easier to find contenders for possible “firsts” in filmmaking than it is with ancient sculpture.

The first motion pictures shot in the United States came not from California but from the East Coast. New Jersey was home to Thomas Edison’s endeavors, and in Chicago there was another pioneer whose name is now little-known today, despite his being honored with a star on the Hollywood Walk of Fame. It was Col. William Selig, a stage magician turned filmmaker. In his biography subtitled The Man Who Invented Hollywood, Chapman University historian Andrew Erish makes the case of Selig’s business likely having been the first one in the USA to attempt several genres and storytelling devices that have since become well-established.

Edison’s movie The Great Train Robbery from 1903 is considered one of the earliest westerns. But it was shot in New York and New Jersey. Selig’s company was the first to shoot westerns on location in the actual American West with real cowboys and Native Americans. Edison’s What Happened to Mary from 1912 is thought to be the earliest serial for theaters. But each installment is self-contained, ending with resolution to that episode’s story. There was also the three-part crime drama Fantomas from France in April 1913. By contrast, Selig’s The Adventures of Kathlyn, beginning its run in December 1913, is the earliest-known American theater serial in which, except for the final one, every installment ends on a cliffhanger.

Of all motion pictures that are fictional depictions of adventures in jungles, the earliest-known one came from Denmark in 1907. That was Lion Hunting. The first fiction movie to come from an American company about such a safari arrived in 1909 with Selig’s Big Game Hunting in Africa.

The earliest-known horror movie is from France — The Manor of the Devil by the auteur Georges Méliès. We will return to him soon enough. According to the New York Film Academy, this “three-minute film is complete with cauldrons, animated skeletons, ghosts, transforming bats, and, ultimately, an incarnation of the Devil. While not intended to be scary — more wondrous, as was Méliès’s MO — it was the first example of a film (only just rediscovered in 1977) to include the supernatural and set a precedent for what was to come.” Selig’s company was behind the earliest-known horror movie produced in the USA, Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde in 1908. This movie, though, consisted simply of shooting a stage production of the literary classic. The movie even begins by showing a stage’s curtains opening and, correspondingly, ends with them closing. In 1910 Edison’s company followed that with the first screen adaptation of Frankenstein. In contrast to Selig’s movie, the scenes of this Frankenstein were shot in separate locations; it is clearly not confined to a single stage.

Selig’s company also made the USA’s earliest-known feature-length narrative fiction movie, The Spoilers from 1914.

Around the same time, France had its own stage-magician-turned-filmmaker, whom Selig adulated. This man was Georges Méliès, our aforementioned auteur behind the earliest-known horror movie. As might be expected by one of the first movie makers to depict ghosts and the Devil, Méliès pioneered various special effects and editing techniques that continue to be employed. As noted by YouTube filmmaker David Yeaman, Méliès pioneered in such techniques as stop-edits, dissolves, and double exposures.

A stop-edit is done when the movie camera is stationary. It shoots for a little while. Then the filmmaker stops shooting. Between takes, the filmmaker changes something about the objects within the camera’s view. Then the filmmaker starts shooting again. The effect is that, when you watch the movie afterward, it looks as though the change is instantaneous. If you first shoot an object, then stop the camera, remove the object while keeping everything else the same, and then start shooting again, in the playback of your movie it will appear as though the object instantly disappeared into nowhere.

This editing technique is the basis for the stop-motion animation orchestrated by Willis O’Brien in King Kong, by Ray Harryhausen in The Seventh Voyage of Sinbad, and by Phil Tippett with Jabba the Hutt’s rancor monster in The Return of the Jedi. The puppeteer shoots one frame of his puppet, moves the puppet slightly, shoots another frame in the new position, and so on. The final product onscreen is the illusion that the puppet moves on its own, albeit jerkily.

Retired East Carolina film studies professor James C. Holte says that by some anecdotal accounts, Méliès may have initially stumbled on his stop-edit technique by accident. As the story goes, Méliès had his camera rolling as he shot a scene out on a real street. A cable car came into view exactly as the film jammed. After unjamming the film Méliès resumed his shooting. At that exact moment, a hearse was in the same area of the shot where the cable car had been. When Méliès watched this reel later, he noticed that it seemed as though the cable car had instantly transformed into a hearse.

As noted before, concerning Heinrich Hertz and airwaves, in the the early twentieth century some people liked to say that beneficial “accidents” happen only to those who have good judgment on what to do about them. Here too, other people in Méliès’s position would have dismissed this optical effect as a defect and moved on. Méliès, by contrast, considered how this optical effect could be employed in his storytelling.

Méliès’s “dissolve” effect entails a similar method. It involves one image gradually fading out as, simultaneously, another image fades in. When everything in the shot is kept the same except for one spot where one object fades out and another fades in, the optical effect is similar to what happens with stop-edits, except the change is slower. This effect has been used in classic Universal monster pictures where the face of Lyle Talbot changes from that of a cleanshaven man to that of a furry Wolf Man. Slow dissolves have also been used with two dissimilar images to represent a passage of time that is longer-term than what actually commences onscreen.

Finally, Méliès pioneered in the use of double exposures. This is when one image is superimposed upon another. When this causes a person to appear see-through, the technique can be used to make that person appear as a ghost.

Innovation continued as the era of silent film gave way to movies in which discernible speech could be heard — “talkies.” And here is an uncontested “first” in cinematic arts. 1927’s The Jazz Singer was the first feature-length talkie, emitting sounds and speech synchronized to correspond with the events shown in the image moving onscreen.

A very decidedly innovative movie was 1933’s King Kong, and not merely because of Willis O’Brien’s then-new stop-motion animation. The movie ushered in the use of a technique called miniature screen projection, which was itself derivative of another technique that was still new at the time, rear screen projection.

Kong contains several scenes of the human actors interacting directly with the stop-motion dinosaurs. For many consecutive frames, both the human actors and the dinosaur would be onscreen together and looking at one another. For audiences to find these interactions believable, the movements of both the actors and the dinosaurs would have to be timed to match. Absent of the proper timing, both the human actors and the dinosaurs would seem to be thrashing around randomly unprovoked. To solve this, O’Brien employed rear screen projection and then his own miniature screen projection.

With rear screen projection, the following happens. First the filmmaker shoots a particular snippet of footage. Then the filmmaker shoots the scene onset that is to incorporate that snippet. Behind the objects or actors being filmed at the moment is a glass plate or transparent screen, and behind that glass plate or transparent screen is a movie projector. As this new scene is being shot, the projector projects, onto the glass plate or transparent screen, the snippet of footage that is to be incorporated into the new scene. As the new scene is being shot, the actors in it see the projection of the snippet onto the glass plate or transparent screen and are thereby able to time their movements and lines accordingly.

Even with this method as it was, there were still issues. With King Kong, it was the humans’ sides of the interactions that were shot first. For Willis O’Brien there remained a discrepancy in the timing: the human actors’ movements were filmed in real time whereas O’Brien had to shoot a single frame of his dinosaur on the miniature diorama set he built, turn off the camera, move the dinosaur slightly, shoot another frame, move the dinosaur again, etcetera. To rectify this, O’Brien 1) invented his own special miniature camera for shooting miniatures clearly and 2) employed the rear-screen projection method in a manner convenient for his specialized needs.

On O’Brien’s miniature diorama set, behind the dinosaur, was an area where he set up a stretched-out sheet of clear rubber. Onto this rubber he projected the snippet of footage of the human actors who were fighting against, or running from, the dinosaur. However, rather than have the snippet play out in real time, O’Brien had the projector project just one frame. He would then move the dinosaur’s body slightly in accordance to where the human actors were and how the dinosaur was to react to them. 

With that being done, O’Brien shot his own frame of the dinosaur’s action in relation to where the humans were and what the humans were doing in the corresponding frame from the already-shot snippet. Subsequently, onto the miniature diorama’s stretched-out transparent rubber O’Brien projected the snippet’s next frame of the human actors. Then O’Brien would once again adjust his dinosaur puppet to provide a proper response to the humans’ movements. And then he would shoot that change.  O’Brien repeated this rather tedious process until he had a seamless final product in which it looked as though the human actors really could see the dinosaur that was growling at or pursuing them. 

For this development, O’Brien was awarded U.S. Utility Patent No. 1,897,673 and U.S. Utility Patent No. 2,029,500. I doubt Rothbardian originality-deniers will like that.

Walt Disney’s Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs in 1937 marks the earliest-known feature-length cel-animation motion picture.

Finally, you can see innovation and originality in the history of how motion pictures have used the storytelling device of “flashbacks.” When I saw 1941’s Citizen Kane, I considered it overrated. However, I did not see it in the same historical context as those who had experienced this movie upon its initial release.

The movie begins with the death of the titular character, newspaper mogul Charles Foster Kane. The story of his life is then told in the form of “flashbacks.” When this movie first arrived in theaters, such a storytelling device was uncommon. The movie employed many such cinematic techniques that, at the time, were relatively unfamiliar. And then it was exactly on account of how groundbreaking Citizen Kane was, that led to its storytelling devices being used in subsequent movies and thereby becoming commonplace.

In literary fiction, the use of flashbacks was much older. The Arabian Nights story “The Three Apples” begins with the discovery of the body of a woman who had been slain. Then her killer recounts the events that led to this incident. This was also a relatively early instance of the murder-mystery genre.

The earliest-known example of a motion picture to have a flashback in it was France’s silent film Histoire d’un Crime in 1901, another crime story. In the USA, D. W. Griffith invoked the technique in 1918’s Hearts of the World.

The earliest-known “talkie” to have flashbacks was 1931’s City Streets starring the same lead of the Fountainhead movie, Gary Cooper. Flashbacks then became more prominent and more frequent eight years later with Wuthering Heights. Much as with the novel that served as its source material, the Wuthering Heights film adaptation has the housekeeper Ellen recount what had happened in the past concerning Heathcliff. Most of the French Le Jour se Lève, or Daybreak, from that same year was dramatized as a flashback. And then, exactly forty years after a motion picture first employed the method, audiences first became well-acquainted with, and entranced by, flashbacks in Citizen Kane.

I hope that, by now, these case studies have demonstrated the following.
  1. Throughout the history of art, there have indeed been instances where someone attempted something that, heretofore in history, had been unprecedented. Hence, in the history of art, there has been much that has been “truly new.”
  2. Historians and scholars are able to make strong cases that a particular artwork may well be the earliest instance of a particular innovation appearing, or that the artwork is at least the earliest-known instance of that innovation. In many instances where some historical figure has been lauded for introducing something novel, those accolades were indeed well-earned.




A “Great Artist” Is a Second-Mover Who “Stole” the First-Mover’s Relatively New Innovation and Then Put His Own Spin on It?
Prior to concluding this essay, I want to address an alleged second interpretation of “Good artists copy, great artists steal.” According to this second interpretation, the saying is less about denying originality’s existence than it is about highlighting what can be called a Second-Mover Advantage in intra-industry competition.

The idea goes something like this. In the past, many people assumed that the first party to introduce a particular innovation to the marketplace — presumably the original inventor — would have an advantage over all would-be competitors vying to sell similar products. On that understanding, that original innovator would be the “first mover.” But, goes this argument, case studies in the history of business reveal that often the financial success and even acclaim for the innovation go not to that first mover but instead to yet another party, a “second mover.” This other party sells versions of this sort of product when that sort of product is still new, but this party is still not the original innovator.

Consumers come to associate the innovation with that second mover, possibly even assuming the second mover is the true originator. And, when the second mover puts his own spin on the innovation, historians might consider the second mover’s rendition to be superior and more praiseworthy than that of the first. Hence, it is this second mover, not the first, who is considered the “great artist.” This second mover did not necessarily steal anything literally from the first mover, but this second mover did — not always by intention — “steal” credit and accolades that ostensibly should have gone to the first mover instead. Hence, “great artists steal.” That is the conclusion of the argument.

Steve Jobs himself appears in the most famous case study. When the Apple Macintosh hit stores in 1984, for consumers it was revolutionary. It was the first time they used a mouse to maneuver a cursor on what was called a graphical user interface (GUI). As far as many of these consumers were concerned, Apple Computer must have originated this technology. Consequently, consumers saluted Jobs for being a “great artist.” However, this technology was originally developed by Douglas Engelbart, other engineers at Xerox’s Palo Alto Research Center (PARC), and various universities. Apple Computer did not steal this invention literally; it paid licensing fees to Xerox. However, as Jobs tacitly allowed the public to associate this technology with Apple instead of Engelbart and Xerox PARC, Jobs “stole” their applause.

Similarly, when moviegoers from the late 1930s to early 1940s encountered Citizen Kane, this was often the first movie they could recall in which the story was told with the framing device of flashbacks. This, among many other attributes of Citizen Kane, made writer-director-producer-star Orson Welles a “great artist.” Yet, to this day, even many of the most seasoned cinephiles remain unaware that a motion picture had made use of flashbacks four decades prior in Histoire d’un Crime. In that respect, it might be said that “great artist” Orson Welles “stole” flashbacks from Histoire d’un Crime.

The word steal usually has a stigma to it, even when someone like Austin Kleon tries to soften it by calling something a “good theft.” Yet many people who say that the Macintosh’s incorporation of the GUI exemplifies the principle of “Great artists steal” say this not with disapproval toward Steve Jobs but, perversely, a cynical sort of admiration. The insinuation is often “Jobs was not being the most moral person by conventional standards. But in terms of getting all the glory — the same sort of glory I aspire to — Steve Jobs won. He won to a degree much greater than Douglas Engelbart. And I have to hand it to him there.”

After all, many movie buffs aware of Histoire d’un Crime will say that Citizen Kane is still the higher-quality movie. They will say that the higher quality proves that Orson Welles remains a “great artist.” And they will add that they do think he “stole” the flashback motif from Histoire d’un Crime, meaning that it is true that it is the “great artists” who “steal.”

Even in these cases, I find both the cynicism and the use of the word steal misleading — even when Jobs spoke it himself. The fact is that Steve Jobs, not Engelbart or Xerox, is the party who took the specific action of moving this economic value through the supply chain to bring it to market and, hence, to consumers. Had Jobs not taken an interest, this technology would have remained stuck in the laboratory, unseen by consumers for many more years. The act of Jobs and Apple having moved this product through the supply chain, from the laboratory to the retail stores, when they did — whereas Engelbart and Xerox did not — is itself an economic value for which Jobs, and not Engelbart, deserves credit. Likewise, we can acknowledge Engelbart, Xerox PARC, and the other university computer scientists for being the parties to have developed the earliest versions of this important technology. There is no inevitable conflict there.

It was in an interview for Robert X. Cringely’s PBS documentary series Triumph of the Nerds where Steve Jobs first told the public that his motto was “Good artists copy, great artists steal.” In that interview, the context was that Jobs disclosed that he did not want Apple Computer’s personnel to be hobbled by a Not-Invented-Here attitude. That is, Jobs did not want Apple’s engineers to dismiss other companies’ ideas as unworthy of adoption simply for having come from outside of Apple. When Apple’s competitors had objectively good ideas, Jobs said, Apple’s engineers should consider those ideas and apply them when they can.

That is fine, but such incorporation of others’ ideas should apply no more than at the level of the general. Applying the best general ideas of others should not come at the expense of other people’s rightful claims of ownership over their own specific original works. And, as I hope this essay has made clear, those rightful claims of ownership are principles that are moral and reputational, not just legal. Morally, rightful respect for someone else’s intellectual creations extends beyond application in court with the enforcement of patents and copyrights. Rightful ownership, as Howard Roark can attest, also consists of crediting the innovation’s originator and recognizing that originator’s moral authority in exercising control over her original presentations and designs. When Steve Jobs says that great artists such as himself do “steal,” it seems to be an inadvertent, passive admission that Douglas Engelbart has not received, reputationally, proper due for the Macintosh’s best features.

In his philosophic YouTube video essay “You Are Unoriginal,” Thomas Rebour concludes by declaring, “It’s arrogant and presumptuous to believe that I deserve to ‘own’ certain ideas.” Yet it is Rebour being presumptuous and pretentious. James Clerk Maxwell does rightfully “own” his postulation of the existence of airwaves. Maxwell owns it not in that other people are to be prevented from learning from the idea. But Maxwell does own it in that we recognize properly the breakthrough in his having taken the initiative to putting all the clues together — and his having done so when even his excellent contemporaries in the study of electromagnetism had not.




Conclusion
That intellectual blog I cited earlier — the one that gleefully quoted Mark Twain, Alexander Graham Bell, and Henry Miller about “The Myth of Originality” — also provides a quotation from Steve Jobs that is more nuanced than “Good artists copy, great artists steal.” This time, Jobs says in a 1996 interview with Wired magazine,
Creativity is just connecting things. When you ask creative people how they did something, they feel a little guilty because they didn’t really do it, they just saw something. It seemed obvious to them after a while. That’s because they were able to connect experiences they’ve had and synthesize new things.
That quotation, much like T. S. Eliot’s original “Mature poets steal” quotation, is nothing better than a mixed bag. And, as with the original quotation by T. S. Eliot, the phrasing is very misleading. Jobs acknowledges that particular individuals — as opposed to society in general — are indeed bringing about “new things” (emphasis mine) and that these particular individuals are “creative.” The part about “connecting things” refers to the manner in which an innovation, per Aristotle, takes hold of some familiar ideas and conventions and then “connect[s]” them to a new context in which they are unfamiliar.

But then Jobs says these people are “just connecting things,” the word just insinuating that this is not the big deal it is made out to be. Lest anyone dispute that he meant to downplay the grandeur of it, Jobs continues that these innovators “didn’t really do it.” That anticipates President Obama declaring to entrepreneurs proud of their own economic value-creation that “You didn’t build that.” This is related to the cliché with which this essay started. If the innovator “didn’t really do it,” then the innovator, despite being a “great artist,” cannot properly take full ownership over her innovation. In that respect, the thinking goes, the innovator’s own innovation is something the innovator “stole,” be it an oxymoronic “good theft” or otherwise.

Innovation indeed involves connecting familiar ideas with unfamiliar contexts, but innovation is not “just connecting things.” It is a lot. As Ayn Rand observed, the innovator did do something new, and over that novelty, the innovator has the rightful primary claim of full ownership.

There was someone who said something similar to Steve Jobs about connecting ideas, but did so in a fashion much more accurately and eloquently, and who, thankfully, acknowledged much more overtly how human beings are capable of doing that which is original, unprecedented. It was Christiane Nüsslein-Volhard, who won the 1995 Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine for discovering the process by which embryos develop. In December 2016 to a panel of other Nobelists, she considered,
If you want to be original, not just productive, you have to concentrate and be a little isolated from interchanging constantly with other people and other influences. . . . This “networking” idea that you constantly have to be in contact with other people, I don’t think is the best way. I mean you need to be connected [with others], of course, but you also have to find your own way, and not be constantly asking, “What are the others doing, and what’s coming up there, and what’s coming up there?” I think it’s really important. . . . I think creativity, in a sense, is combining facts which no one else had combined before.
Note Dr. Nüsslein-Volhard’s emphasis on the need for psychological independence. James Clerk Maxwell combined ideas that had not been combined before, and that was only part of his unprecedented insight, his originality.

I said it on Twitter years before, and I say it again: “Good artists copy, great artists steal” is an insipid cliché that needs to go out of circulation. It should go extinct in Silicon Valley and everywhere else. That saying, along with “Originality is a myth” and “Nothing in art has ever truly been new,” are what people say when they are being pretentious.

It is only by the vaguest definitions and the loosest criteria by which someone can say that throughout history no one has truly exercised originality in artistic media. It is merely by defining artwork only by the most crudely-drawn parameters, and by looking at the concepts no more closely than at the most general level, that someone can say that everything in art is a copy of other artwork. But as with the specific designs, delineations, and presentations protected in copyrights and patents, it is the matter that originality in art is defined by specifics. The Arabian Nights story of “The Three Apples” made use of the flashback motif centuries prior to the silent movie Histoire d’un Crime doing it. But Histoire d’un Crime being the earliest-known motion picture to have done it means that Histoire d’un Crime remains a cinematic “first” and should be remembered as such.

That principle remains in effect even if one judges Citizen Kane to have executed the flashback motif in a manner more artful, cohesive, and aesthetically pleasing than did Histoire d’un Crime. Remembering Histoire d’un Crime for one sort of accomplishment does not take away from Citizen Kane, and vice versa.

To look at art history and to use logic is to discredit the cliché that in art “Nothing is truly new.” There was a time when there was no motion pictures, let alone motion pictures making use of flashbacks in their storytelling. Now there are many motion pictures that do that. It stands to reason that some party was the first to do it, and, in so doing, thought specific thoughts and took specific actions absent of exact historical precedent. At every increment of creative change and progress, there is something truly new.

Yes, talented artists and innovators do learn from the techniques of others and they do apply those lessons, on a general level, to their own work. By the same token, the history of art and technology is still the history of many developments that, until someone chose to enact them, had been without precedent.

And through proper documentation, often historians are able to find evidence by which they can discern which party was likely the first to do what. By that method, even specific artists who are not as well-remembered as Orson Welles can get their due. These are great artists.

Great artists don’t steal. Great artists originate.





On Sunday, November 9, 2025 around 2:07 a.m., I added the quotation from Todd Kashan about how something is most interesting to you when it is the desired balance between familiar and unfamiliar. On Friday, March 20, 2026, I added the creatio-ex-materia sentences.