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| Some Objectivists really dislike the Nolan Chart, but that was the inspiration for the chart I made here. |
Asked about Ayn Rand's book The Virtue of Selfishness, the late Christopher Hitchens cracked, "I don't think there's any need to have essays advocating selfishness among human beings. I don't know what your impression has been, but some things require no further reinforcement," to the guffaws of his audience. Indeed, a common line of thought goes as follows: The default is for people to do what they want. And isn't taking an action to get what you "want" the very definition of acting in your self-interest? It is superfluous, then, for a writer such as Ayn Rand to encourage people to act in their self-interest. That was what they were going to do anyway, right?
The answer is no. To do what one "wants" is too vague; to act in one's self-interest is more specific and complex than doing what one "wants." For example, I can tell you that I have always loved the taste of butterscotch and, this moment, I want to eat this butterscotch candy. But I also know that, as an adult, I have become allergic to butterscotch. If I eat this butterscotch candy, I will experience a terribly uncomfortable rash, and I do not want that. What, then, is it for me to do what I "want": (a) to eat the butterscotch candy now, which will give me immediate gratification but also give me an uncomfortable rash minutes later, or (b) to forgo the the butterscotch candy, which will deprive me of such deliciousness but also spare me of a definitely unwanted allergic reaction?
Each of those options will, in some context, give me an outcome I "want." But I evaluate that one of those options is more in line with my self-interest than the other is. This is because to act in one's own self-interest is more precise than "doing what one wants"; it is about performing actions that provide lasting happiness, considering future consequences while also taking some time to enjoy the present as much as possible.
On this understanding of "self-interest," to behave self-interestedly is not merely to do what one "wants," what one feels like doing at the immediate moment. It is also to examine the most viable options available and to consider the long-rang ramifications of each of those options. Hence, to behave self-interested requires putting careful thought into one's chosen courses of action. In that respect, acting in one's self-interest -- by definition -- cannot be automatic, as careful deliberation is not automatic. Insofar as having good consequences is in your self-interest, behaving self-interestedly is not something that can be done on autopilot.
The conversation that Yaron Brook had with philosopher Greg Salmieri on the March 18, 2018 episode of the Living Objectivism podcast go me thinking about this. I have another way to phrase it: if someone does something clearly self-destructive, and tries to justify that action as self-interested (because the self-destructive action seems to bring immediate but fleeting gratification), then that is not acting in one's self-interest. Instead, it is going through the motions of acting in one's self-interest.
Imagine there are pests in my garden. I announce it is my intention to get rid of them. I spray a particular chemical pesticide in my yard, and yet it doesn't kill them. You could say it appears that I honestly intended to kill the pests but that I failed. But suppose that, for five years, every day I apply that same chemical in that same small dosage when, at this point, it is obvious that this method will not destroy the pests. You would be correct in saying, "Intention is necessarily tied to results; to intend X is to perform an action that you expect will cause X to become more likely an outcome. You say you do Y to bring about X, and yet, at this juncture, repeated observation indicates that Y doesn't cause X. If you genuinely intended to cause X, you would try another potential solution, Z. That you haven't reconsidered your method gives the impression that you're not sincere about intending X (to kill the pests in the garden); you do not intend X, but intend to go through the motions of trying to bring about X."
I have previously made this point with respect to whether communists truly intend to alleviate poverty. Perhaps someone who advocated communism in 1848 truly believed that implementing communism would eradicate poverty. But communism has been tried for over one hundred years and, far from mitigating penury, communism's implementation only exacerbates it. After witnessing the dismal results for decades, we are justified in saying, "If you truly intended to alleviate poverty, you admit that communism is a failure and you would opt for something else in the effort to fight poverty, such as the same political-economic liberalization that lifted Hong Kong and Taiwan out of destitution. That you keep implementing communism, when it is now clear that communism does not alleviate poverty, evinces that you do not honestly intend to alleviate poverty. Communism is not a means to the end of alleviating poverty; communism is the end, and the 'intention' to alleviate poverty is the rationalization. Communism does not intend to alleviate poverty; communism intends to go through the motions of attempting to alleviate poverty."
Upon listening to the March 18 Yaron Brook Show podcast, I think that this distinction between (a) intending X versus (b) going through the motions of intending X, also applies to someone who calls himself self-interested on account of his following every impulse.
Someone who repeatedly engages in a self-destructive action, causing pain to those who care about him, is commonly accused of being too self-interested. He is allegedly self-interested because he does what he feels like doing. But to care about one's self-interest is not to indulge every whim; it is to take actions that yield long-term happy results for oneself. What, then, can be said of someone who says he is looking out for his self-interest, and uses that as his rationale for engaging in a self-destructive action repeatedly? If a man refrains from taking care of his own well-being, instead focusing only on what seems to be his immediate contentment, then that man is not acting in his self-interest; he is going through the motions of acting in his self-interest.
If I want to act according to my self-interest, not just going through the motions of doing so, then I have to ruminate on my alternatives and their likely results. Exercising one's judgment wisely is not automatic, and yet that is what it takes to conduct oneself self-interestedly. Because behaving wisely, for the sake of one's lasting well-being, is not automatic and and does not happen by default, neither is acting in one's self interest something that is automatic or by default.
