Transcript of Jordan Peterson Confirming His Belief That If an Atheist Doesn’t Commit Random Violence, It’s Because, Deep Down, That Atheist Is a Theist

And: Dr. Peterson’s Assertion That “It’s Not an Obvious Fact” That a Man’s Head Being Chopped Off Would Be Detrimental to That Same Man’s Well-Being

Screen shot of Dr. Peterson’s conversation with Matthew Dillahunty.

A public assertion of Dr. Jordan B. Peterson’s is that it is only a belief in God that will stop someone from choosing to commit random acts of violence. That raises the question of how Dr. Peterson accounts for atheists who refrain from random acts of violence. Dr. Peterson’s answer is that if an atheist does not choose to commit random acts of violence, it is primarily because, deep down, that atheist must actually believe in God.

That is circular reasoning. The conclusion is that if an atheist does not commit random acts of violence, it is only because he or she, deep down, must actually believe in God. And how can we verify that? That is verified, according to Dr. Peterson, by the truth that only a belief in God can stop someone from choosing to commit random acts of violence.

Is what I wrote above an attempt to put words in Dr. Peterson’s mouth, à la Cathy Newman’s infamous interview with Dr. Peterson on Channel Four?

Below is a transcript of an exchange that Dr. Peterson had with stage mentalist Matthew Dillahunty. Dillahunty asks Dr. Peterson for clarification—asking him to confirm whether he means that if an atheist refrains from committing acts of violence, it must be because that atheist, on some level, is really a theist, a believer in God. Dr. Peterson confirms that.

The exchange begins at the 0:41:29 mark of the video of the conversation. The embedded version below should be cued so that if you click on it, it should begin at the 0:41:29 mark. (Thank you to Mark Sulkowski for informing me on May 12, 2018, about this particular video.)




On the bottom of the transcript is an exchange from the 0:47:38 mark that I found interesting as well; the assertion that Dr. Peterson makes there may sound outlandish to many people, but it is not considered outlandish among philosophy graduate students. There, Dr. Peterson’s position is that if a man’s head is chopped off, it is “not an obvious fact” that the decapitation is detrimental toward the man’s well-being. According to Dr. Peterson, such an assessment is no more than a subjective opinion.

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Dillahunty: “For years I had this thing going where people would say, ‘Oh,’—and this is kind of from where we’re getting from a different angle—I would say, ‘They [religious people] would be afraid of what we lose if we did without religion.’ And I basically said, ‘Demonstrate to me any benefit—’”

Peterson (interrupts): “—You’d lose art and poetry and drama and narrative and story . . .”

Dillahunty: “Why? Are there no godless artists and poets?”

Peterson: “There are artists and poets who [only] think they’re godless . . .”

Dillahunty: “So we’ve might’ve crossed over into a problem area—”

Peterson (over Dillahunty): “Yeah . . . No doubt.”

Dillahunty: “I can’t draw for crap, although I do draw during the show. But one of the individuals who came to the show the other night handed me something she had spent a great deal of time drawing. She’s a wonderful artist and I was grateful to get it. And while I pretend to read minds on stage, I constantly acknowledge that I can’t actually read minds, so I can’t tell you whether or not she actually believes in a god, but I can tell you that I actually don’t believe in a God, and I can write poetry.”

Peterson (before Dillahunty finishes with “—and I can write poetry”): “But you act like you do [believe in God].”

Dillahunty: “Huh?”

Peterson: “But you act like you do [believe in God]. That’s why you didn’t throw Sam [Harris] off the stage.”

Dillahunty: “No, now you’re making a claim— . . . OK, I’m telling you I don’t believe there’s a God—”

Peterson (before Dillahunty finishes): “Yeah . . .”

Dillahunty (continuing): “—and your response is to that is: I [Dillahunty] really do, because I have a moral sense. But my moral sense is utterly without any appeal to a God.”

Peterson: “[You mean only] explicitly . . .”

Dillahunty (corrects Peterson): “Or implicitly.”

Peterson (rhetorical, sarcastic): “Uh, maybe . . .”

Dillahunty (starts to talk but is interrupted).

Peterson: “That’s not so obvious.”

Dillahunty: “OK—” interrupted.

Peterson: “You regard Sam Harris as an implicitly valuable entity because, otherwise, you would just throw him off the stage. And then the question is, ‘Just exactly why is an implicitly valuable entity?’ What’s your metaphysics of that?”

Dillahunty: “I don’t think he’s implicitly valuable in the sense that . . .” stops as audience laughs.

The 0:43:21 mark.

Dillahunty: “I don’t think he’s implicitly valuable in that the Universe [being some teleological force itself] has implied that there is something explicit about it. For me, morality is far simpler—”

Peterson (interrupts): “But wait, you sounded doubtful about that.”

Dillahunty (sarcastic): “Maybe you’re the mind reader . . .”

Peterson (sarcastic back): “Well, maybe.”

Dillahunty: “—because you’ve already suggested that despite me sitting here and having talked about this for decades that I don’t believe in God, I actually do because I have a moral code. But my moral code, which I’ve—”

Peterson (interrupts): “Be more specific. I said it was because you didn’t want to throw Sam [Harris] off the stage.”

Dillahunty: “You didn’t even attempt to ask me why I didn’t throw Sam off the stage. Instead you went to ‘why do you think Sam has implicit value?’ because, according to your narrative, that’s the only [possible] justification.”

Peterson: “Well, you’re afraid of being punished.”

Dillahunty: “No.”

Peterson: “Oh.”

Dillahunty: “I think I can have a perfectly acceptable foundation for secular morality even if it fundamentally centers around selfishness. I’d rather not be thrown off the stage. It’s in my best interest to encourage that sort of understanding in others, and therefore I will not throw him off the stage. I would rather not have my stuff stolen, and thus it’s in my best interest to encourage others not to do that, so I will not steal stuff, and I will work with others to ensure that people who steal stuff are punished. It is in a virtually pragmatic moral system—”

Peterson (interrupts): “Why do you think it’s not in your best interest to have stuff stolen from you or to be thrown off the stage?”

Dillahunty: “Why is it not in my best interest . . .?”

Peterson: “Yeah, yeah . . . You don’t get to think, ‘Oh, that’s self-evident.’ It’s like, ‘Nothing is self-evident to the skeptic’ [throwing that idea back at him]. Let’s keep that in mind.”

Dillahunty (humorous): “Oh, well . . . so, uh . . .”

Peterson: “ ‘cause if we’re going to get skeptical here, we might as well go all the way.”

Dillahunty: “For Sam [Harris] and I, the foundation—and we’re not the only ones, but I tend to reference Sam because someone will say, ‘Well, that’s exactly what Sam Harris says’, except, you know, I’ve been giving this lecture before he wrote his book [*The End of Faith*], but his book is better than my lecture, so read his book—when I talk about this, I talk about well-being as the language that Sam uses. . .”

Peterson (interrupts, shaking his head): “SAD!”

Dillahunty: “I don’t care whether or not someone else considers that morality. I would think that, at a minimum, would you and agree that—?”

Peterson (interrupts): “That whole ‘well-being’ thing, man, as a basis for metaphysics, that’s just a non-starter.”

Dillahunty: “We’re not basing metaphysics on it.”

Peterson: “Sam is.”

Dillahunty: “No, he’s not.”

Peterson: “Yes, he is, ‘cause he’s out back to well-being.”

Dillahunty: “Well, you take it up with Sam.”

Peterson: “Well, OK, sorry. Do you think I’m wrong about that claim? That’s what I understood reading him.”

Dillahunty: “I don’t think Sam said anything metaphysical about it. So here’s the thing. We are physical beings—”

Peterson (interrupts): “Well, it’s his fundamental claim. So it’s sort of at the basis of his ethic. So he says we should work to maximize people’s well-being, or, at least . . . he does a bit more than that . . . He says we should minimize suffering.”

Dillahunty: “He’s not ‘maximize-minimize’ in this simple consequentialism. Let me do this. We’re physical beings in a physical universe, and laws [of Nature] dictate how things work in the universe. They [the laws of nature] are the ultimate arbiters of what is or isn’t in our best interest, whether we know it or not. So, for example, as far as I can tell—”

Peterson (interrupts): “Then why do you need free will?”

Dillahunty: “I don’t think we have free will.”

Peterson: “Then why do you attribute agency to things, if the laws of the universe— . . . There was a contradiction . . .”

Dillahunty: “Free will isn’t relevant to this.”


_________________


The 0:47:38 mark.

This embedding should be cued to start at 0:47:38.


Dillahunty: “The reason we talk about this [ethics] in terms of well-being is because irrespective of whether or not I care about well-being, there are facts about well-being.”

Peterson (challenges): “Sure, let’s hear ‘em, man. And line those suckers up.”

Dillahunty: “If you chop off my head, it’s in contradiction to my well-being.”

Peterson: “No, I wasn’t willing to grant you that, actually [that chopping off someone’s head is bad for his well-being]. I’m saying that [the observation that chopping off someone’s head will hurt him] is [only] a metaphysical presupposition. You’re just saying I have to accept that [chopping off someone’s head will hurt him].”

Dillahunty: “No, I’m not telling you at all what to accept.”

Peterson: “Sure you are. You’re saying your death would be [normatively] wrong [as a value-judgment, as opposed to being a fact].”

Dillahunty: “I’m trying to explain what my position is.”

Peterson: “OK, but  you said that that wouldn’t be in accordance with your well-being. ’kay, that’s a  metaphysical statement, a philosophical statement. It’s not an obvious fact.”

Why ‘Existence Always Existed’ Is Likelier Than ‘Something Created All Existence’

or, The Conjunction Fallacy in Cosmology

Stuart K. Hayashi

Fall-Winter 2009 semester at Hawaii Pacific University

Two Questions
Question 1: Suppose there is a woman named Linda, and here is what we know about her: She writes a lot of poetry about capitalists exploiting the masses. In her free time, she wears a beret and attends performance art shows. She reads Noam Chomsky books and is trying to be a raw food vegan. Which of the following is likelier?:

A. Linda is an executive at a big bank.

B. Linda votes for left-wing progressive political candidates, owns a Che Guevara shirt, and works at a big bank as an executive.

According to a psychology experiment by Keith Stanovich and Richard F. West, people who score high on the SAT are more prone to answer B than are people who scored average on the SAT.


Now here's another question.

Question 2: Which of the following scenarios is likelier?:

• A. Some entity always existed. If you try to pinpoint some moment in the past when this entity began to exist, you won't find it; its existence is eternal.
• B. Some entity always existed. If you try to pinpoint some moment in the past when this entity began to exist, you won't find it; its existence is eternal. In fact, this entity is beyond sapient; it makes choices. Moreover, this entity created all other entities existing; everything that exists, exists because of this entity. This entity created all of Existence; there was a time when there was absolute nothingness, and, at the same time there was absolute nothingness, this entity already existed. This entity is also responsible for all morality. It is the final arbiter of moral judgments, and it is the final arbiter of all purpose. If you have a purpose in your existence, it was decided by this entity.

In both cases, the likelier answer is A.



Overcoming the Conjunction Fallacy
Here is the reason. When it comes to the first question, both of your options say that condition X (Linda is a bank executive) is present. The notion that Linda is not a bank executive is not an option. However, option B says that not only is Linda a bank executive, but she is also a political progressive (condition Y). Many people who score high on the SAT notice from the description that Linda fits the stereotype of a political progressive, and therefore they select option B. But in terms of formal logic, A is likelier, because only condition X must be present for A to be true, whereas B requires both conditions X and Y to be true.  The likelihood that X is true is greater than the likelihood that both X and Y are true.   It can be mapped out as follows:

• If X is true, then A is true.
• If X and Y are both true, then both A and B are true.

Logically, then,  A is likelier. That option A does not refer at all to Linda's political progressivism does not stop A from being likelier than B, because B being true presupposes A being true, whereas A being true does not presuppose B being true. When people who score high on the SAT answer that B is likelier, they fall prey to a logical fallacy called the Conjunction Fallacy.

It is for that same reason that in Question 2, answer A is also the likelier option. For either option A or B to be true, some entity always had to exist. Once again, option B cannot be true unless option A is also true, but option B does not have to be true for option A to be true.



Option A: Existence Always Existed; That’s It
Option A refers to an idea from Aristotle's heyday that the Totality of Existence does not need to be created by some external source. That is, Existence does not have to be created by God; something always existed and, if you try to pinpoint some time in the past when Existence emerged into existence, you will not find it.

Some people proclaim that the Big Bang disproves option A, as the Big Bang created the universe. That reflects a misunderstanding of the Big Bang. When physicists talk about the Big Bang, they do not mean that there was absolute nothingness and then an explosion happened, from which all Existence emerged. The idea behind the Big Bang is that at one time, "the universe" was in a particular physical state unalike what it is presently. Then "the universe" underwent some change that altered its form; this change is described rather metaphorically as an "expansion." The use of the term expansion is metaphorical, as it is not exactly the same as the type of "expansion" we normally talk about in our everyday lives; it's not the same as a sponge expanding or a bread loaf expanding.

The Big Bang Theory therefore does not refute the idea that Existence, in some form, already existed. If there was a great "expansion," it presupposes that there was already some entity there to "expand." If we say that the Big Bang created the universe, that statement only makes sense if we make a distinction between "the Totality of Existence" and "the universe as we presently know it," with "the universe as we presently know it" being a subset subsumed under the greater category of "the Totality of Existence." If the universe had to "begin," that universe had to begin within the greater Totality of Existence, which already existed and always existed.

In The Elegant Universe, Cornell University physicist Brian Greene seriously entertains this idea:

...[Maurizio] Gasperini and [Gabriele] Veneziano suggest that there may be a whole prehistory to the universe... In this so-called pre-big-bang scenario, the universe began in a vastly different state than it does in the big bang framework. ... because the pre-big bang epoch involves its own inflationary expansion, [Alan] Guth’s solution to the horizon problem is automatically built into the pre-big bang cosmological scenario [New York: Vintage, 2003 trade paperback second edition, p. 362, emphases author’s].

There Was a Time When Nothing Existed, But At the Same Time Something Existed Before Anything Existed and Then It Made Everything Else That Exists?
Since Thomas Aquinas's time, many theologians and also lay believers scoff at the notion that some entity (the Totality of Existence) always existed. They call it highly improbable, ridiculous. Rather, they say, there was a time when there was absolute nothingness and then God had to put something there. Hence, God created somethingness, as opposed to the nothingness.  But this is a self-contradiction, because anything that exists counts as an entity. If God always existed, then God counts as an entity, and this means that there was already an entity that always existed. Therefore, in Question 2, both options A and B are premised implicitly on the understanding that some entity always existed and did not need to be created by some external creator.

For option A to be true, we only need to say that some entity always existed. For option B to be true, option A must be true -- some entity always existed -- and, in addition to that, the entity necessarily possesses some other traits: it is sapient, it makes choices, it created every other entity, and it imbued those other entities with purpose.

There is another manner in which this can be worded:

Question 3:  Which is likelier?

• A. The Big Bang happened.
• B. The Big Bang happened, and it was caused by an entity that is all-knowing, all-powerful, all-benevolent, and the source of all ethics and the final judge of everything. 

Many people laugh at those of us who say that for Question 2, option A is likelier -- those of us who say that some entity always existed, and that we need not presume this entity to possess so many anthropomorphic traits, such as making choices and creating. We are mocked for thinking Existence always existed and then leaving it at that. Those who laugh at us dismiss that scenario as unlikely. But those laughers overlook that they themselves are saying some entity already always existed and did not need to be created, and then their belief requires assigning various other traits to this entity. People who presume that option B is likelier are falling prey to the conjunction fallacy.

It Doesn't Matter That 'the Universe' Doesn't Value Me; I Remain Metaphysically Significant By the One Meaningful Standard

Stuart K. Hayashi


There is a common philosophic musing that generally goes this way:

We human beings like to think we are so special and accomplished, but we should be humbled by the fact that the universe does not care about us. The universe existed billions of years before we evolved, and it will be around billions or trillions of years after we are gone. We have been to the moon but once, and have not explored even one percent of the universe. We are nothing; we are puny; the Earth will go on, but we won't.

There is a famous George Carlin bit on YouTube that says that; it is also the message of the song "Dust in the Wind" (good music; not-so-hot lyrics).

That viewpoint is most frequently espoused by atheists, and yet those who espouse that viewpoint hold onto a premise that is a vestige of religious belief: it is the assumption that for humans to have value and meaning, humans must be esteemed by some other entity grander than humans. In the case of many believers in Abrahamic religions, for humanity to have meaning, humanity has to be regarded as meaningful by God. Therefore, if there is no God, humanity has no meaning.

Atheists who espouse the viewpoint I described in the beginning hold onto that premise. They, too, assume that for humans to have meaning, humans must be esteemed by some other, grander entity -- here, they substitute God with the universe. And they recognize that the universe does not esteem humans. Therefore, they conclude, humans are metaphysically meaningless, ultimately a blip. That is, these atheists agree with many Christians that for humanity to have meaning, humans must be valued by God. These atheists then say there is no God there to value humans, which therefore precludes the possibility of humans having value.

Here is the problem with that: even though these atheists recognize that the universe does not and cannot value humans literally, they are still being anthropomorphic in assigning, on an implicit level, human psychological traits to the universe. They still assume that for humans to have value and meaning, "the universe" must behave like a human in valuing this species. That is, they set this arbitrary standard whereby they proclaim that for humans to have value, "the universe" has to behave psychologically like a human capable of valuing humans. Then, since "the universe" is not psychologically capable of valuing humans, they proclaim that humans cannot have value.

 That game is rigged, very much in the way that socialists set arbitrary standards for the human species and, upon finally observing that humans do not abide by such ridiculous standards, conclude that the human species is just congenitally disappointing. In the case of the humans-have-no-value people, they set an arbitrary standard for "the universe" to meet (the standard being "Does the universe value me?"), and, upon noticing "the universe" does not value humans, expresses the rueful conclusion that Existence itself is empty and disappointing.

Here is what they miss: my significance is not contingent upon "the universe" acknowledging that it "values" me. The reason "the universe" does not care is that it has no capability of caring. However, a specific class of entities within the universe are capable of caring: sapient organisms.

For an entity to be capable of caring about anything, it must be an organism possessing volition. That which is of detriment to the organism's life is a disvalue; that which furthers or enhances the life of the organism is a positive value.   That organism, capable of volition, examines what it does and does not value, and then accordingly takes action to obtain and secure positive values while avoiding disvalues. "The universe" cannot value me; I can value my place in the universe. I am not to be judged by "the universe's" standards; the universe has principles -- natural law -- but the universe makes no judgments; it has no capacity for making judgments. By contrast, I am capable of making judgments.  The universe, as such, is not teleological; a sapient organism within the universe is teleological.

I do not care a whit that the universe will not care once I am dead; it is meaningless when someone says that the universe's indifference indicates that the universe "regarded" me as useless the entire time. "Usefulness" and "uselessness" have no meaning to any entities but volitional organisms. What is of significance is that, as I remain alive, entities within the universe are useful to me, and that the entire universe itself will be rendered useless to me once I am dead. The issue is not whether I am regarded as useful to the universe; the issue is whether I can regard anything in the universe as useful to me.

I ask not what I can do for the universe. I ask what the universe can do for me.

Here, the proponents of the "universe doesn't care about you" slogan frequently reply, "Then you are conceding that value is entirely subjective, as everything is in relation to you, the subject." Subjective is a misleading term in this context, as it implies "capricious" or "arbitrary." When every value is judged according to what it does for me and my life, those evaluations remain objective. The object- in "objective" refers to the objects I am evaluating, and the -ive refers to the relationship between those objects and me, the subject. When I judge an entity to be an objective value to me, it is because the object provides value in its relationship to me.

Thus, those who say, "Why doesn't the universe care about me?" are asking the wrong question. Instead, one's life is the standard by which one judges the universe and everything in it, and one must ask oneself what in the universe one cares about.

Yes, people shout at me, "The universe does not care about you!"

To that, I can only reply, "There is no reason for me to care that the universe doesn't care." ^_^